Tank group Guderian end point. The collapse of the Barbarossa plan

There are many versions about who stopped Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group in November 1941 and saved Moscow. The merit is attributed to the onset of cold weather, Zhukov's military leadership talents, Guderian's mistakes, the heroism of the Tula militias, material assistance from the Western allies ...
I offer my version of events.

Just in case, I will initially answer those readers of my magazine who may appear in the comments with their crown cry: “They filled up the meat!”
During the Battle of Moscow, the Germans were outnumbered! In tanks, in aviation, in people ... When the culminating battles for Tula were going on, there was one German tank for every fifteen Tula workers' militias !!!

It was the Germans who filled up the vicinity of Tula not only with their "meat", but also with their "iron".
This is obvious to me and I am not going to discuss this topic further.
Now about the merits of Zhukov. Of course, the exactingness of Georgy Konstantinovich, his rigidity, played a role in the defense of Moscow. As the war progressed, he became an intelligent, prudent military strategist. But in November 1941, he was still gaining experience and his personal qualities could not have decisive consequences.

There is a lot of controversy regarding Guderian's mistakes. But all these disputes are from the category of "if only, if only." The fact is that, to this day, the undefeated "fast Heinz" was the first to receive a luley. And the most offensive thing is that the poorly trained Tula militiamen and lightly armed NKVD soldiers hung on him.
In modern Russian cinema, they like to show the Stalinist NKVD with the habits of the current policemen. So everyone who likes to yell about the “bloody NKVD” must remember that it was the NKVD fighters, who, according to filmmakers, shoot at the backs of the Red Army, in fact, up to a regiment, poured into the general, who effortlessly smashed the best European armies.
Let me remind you that in the most critical days of the fighting, the Tula workers' regiment, the 156th NKVD regiment, the 732nd anti-aircraft artillery regiment and a police battalion stood in the way of the attacking 100 tanks of Guderian's 2nd tank group.

As for another liberal argument - frost as the cause of German failures, so much has been said about this that it is impossible to say anything without repeating.
Of course, it is more difficult to attack in winter. Of course, the Germans, hoping for a blitzkrieg, were poorly prepared for hostilities in the winter.
But in 1942 they had time to prepare, but a catastrophe awaited them near Stalingrad in the winter! So it's not only and not so much in unpreparedness.

It is safe to say that the victory near Moscow was due to several factors: the outstanding properties of the Soviet fighters, the growing skill of commanders, favorable weather conditions, and another factor that is often overlooked. For me, as an industrial historian, he seems to be the most important.
In the second half of 1941, the Soviet economy most clearly demonstrated its advantages over capitalist production.
However, whenever the subject of armaments comes up, liberal historians bring up the old song about Lend-Lease deliveries. Say, Germany (i.e. all of Europe) was alone - alone, and the USSR was actively helped by the USA and Great Britain.
But in October 1941, when the battles for Tula began and Guderian's tank group was stopped, only the first convoys arrived in the USSR and these weapons simply did not have time to get to the front.

Our country inflicted the first defeat until that day on the invincible Wehrmacht with its own weapons.

Well, they drove the Germans from Moscow, too, mainly with their weapons!

The supply of raw materials and materials to Soviet factories also could not have any effect on the hostilities in October-November - they simply did not have time to do anything from them.
Well, for clarity, let's compare the production of weapons in the USSR and in Germany in 1941.

Rifles and carbines
USSR (second half of 1941) - 1 million 560 thousand
Germany (all year) - 1 million 359 thousand

Infantry automatic weapons
USSR (second half of 1941) - 175.9 thousand people
Germany (all year) - 325 thousand people

Tanks and self-propelled guns
USSR (second half of 1941) - 4.8 thousand
Germany (all year) - 5.2 thousand

mortars
USSR (second half of 1941) - 30.2 thousand
Germany (all year) - 7.2 thousand

combat aircraft
USSR (second half of 1941) - 8.2 thousand people
Germany (all year) - 9.5 thousand

The Soviet Union, which lost huge territories, huge human resources, simultaneously moved thousands of enterprises beyond the Urals, and even before the war had a much weaker industry, monthly produced more weapons in 1941 than Germany with its huge but poorly managed economy!

Picture above from Wikipedia: Tula militias are fighting.

Fourth Star Wars. Author: Leinster Murray Year: Edition: Looming Library Pages: ISBN: , This volume presents the work of M. Foster ("Warriors of the Dawn"), M. Leinster ("Space Prospector" and "Proxima Centauri Trap"), W. Nolon ("Space is employed") and G. Preston ("Fearless Fifteen"). Murray Leinster, Michael Foster, Henry Preston. This volume presents the work of M. Foster ("Warriors of the Dawn"), M. Leinster ("Space Prospector" and "Trap of Proxima Centauri"), W.

Nolon ("Space is employed") and G. Preston ("Fearless Fifteen"). Five space action movies in which brave heroes surf the universe, fighting evil, defending their lives and the lives of their loved ones, and who simply cannot live without all this, will not leave indifferent fans of this genre. Translated from English.

Elsewhere the fog was darker, in some places where it became quite thin and one or two sparks of stars flickered in the bald patches. Their distance could only be expressed in light years.

The rest of the fog - or haze - was illuminated to the point of uniformity - both to the right and to the left, and below and above. Murray Leinster (June 16 – June 8) was an American science fiction writer. Real name - William Fitzgerald Jenkins (Eng. William Fitzgerald Jenkins). Office of War Information) during World War II. The Fourth Star Wars: [Compilation]: trans. from English. / Murray Leinster; comp. A. Sayapin. – Tallinn: Looming Library, Murray Leinster.

This volume presents the work of M. Foster ("Warriors of the Dawn"), M. Leinster ("Space Prospector" and "The Trap of Proxima Centauri"), W. Nolon ("Space is Hired") and G. Preston ("Fifteen Fearless "). Five space action movies in which brave heroes surf the universe, fighting evil, defending their lives and the lives of their loved ones, and who simply cannot live without all this, will not leave indifferent fans of this genre. All books are on sale () Books are loaded daily at 3, 9 and 23 hours.

Leinster Murray. Fourth Star Wars.. We continue the publication of the series ``Star Wars``. In this volume, we want to bring to your attention five ``cool`` super-new action movies, and also for the first time published in Russian.

The main place among them is occupied by the novel by M. Foster ``The Dawn Wars``. One of the outlying planets solar system is being mysteriously attacked by the brutal warriors who call themselves the Warriors of Dawn. Well-trained invaders. Murray Leinster. Murray Leinster. Birth Name: William Fitzgerald Jenkins Aliases: Murray Leinster

Date of birth: June 16 (). paper book. Fourth Star Wars. This volume presents the works of M. Foster ("Warriors of the Dawn"), M. Leinster ("Space Prospector" and "Trap of Proxima Centauri"), W.

Nolon ("Space works for hire") and G. Preston ("- (format: 60x90 / 16, p.) More paper book. Star Wars (set of 13 books). Any significant film or book gives rise to sequels, both author's and and created by fans and just sympathizers.

The epic of J. Lucas Star Wars has made a huge contribution to the world of science fiction, and.

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Throw to Smolensk. 1941

The plan was extremely audacious. In just eight weeks, the German troops were to defeat the Red Army to the death in a dizzying blitzkrieg and dictate peace terms to the Soviets in Moscow.

When Barbarossa begins, Hitler declared, the whole world will hold its breath! Indeed, the troops that crossed the Soviet borders from the Arctic Circle to the shores of the Black Sea in the early summer of 1941 were the greatest concentration military force that the world has ever seen in its history.

As part of the German group, preparing to cross the border with the USSR, there were up to 150 divisions (of which at least 17 tank and 13 motorized) - a total of three million soldiers. 600,000 units Vehicle, about 3,500 tanks and over 7,000 artillery pieces, supported by 2,700 Luftwaffe aircraft. The supply men did their best and prepared warehouses and bases by mid-June, collecting fuel and ammunition, which would be enough to fuel an offensive to a depth of 600 to 700 km. In the opinion of a modern specialist, there is one dubious (if not alarming) moment in this excellent scheme - data on horse-drawn transport, which was assigned a significant role in servicing Operation Barbarossa: 300,000 horses were to be played essential role in this monumental military enterprise, or "Unternman Barbarossa".

10.5 cm gun firing at cut off Soviet troops
130 km west of Kyiv. When Guderian's tank divisions
and Gotha rushed forward north of the Pripyat marshes, huge
concentrations of Red Army forces remaining in Ukraine,
turned out to be open to maneuver on the environment.
The deployment of army groups and the direction of their advance were largely dictated by dominant geographical factors, namely, the Pripyat swamps (or Pinsk swamps) separating Belarus from Ukraine, an almost impassable piece of territory stretching about 150 km from north to south and 500 km from east to west. Because of them, at the first stage of the operation, it simply could not be achieved a strong contact between Army Group "South", advancing from Lublin in the direction of Kyiv and the lower reaches of the Dnieper River, and two other groups operating to the north - that is, Army Group "Center", aimed at Smolensk and then (at least according to the plan of the military leadership) at Moscow, and Army Group North, starting from East Prussia to Lake Peipus and further to Leningrad.
Ju 87 "Stuka" over the USSR in July 1941. As in Poland and in
French dive bombers "Shtuka"
demonstrated their exceptional effectiveness
and in the USSR. Soviet fighters have practically disappeared since
skies under the blows of the Luftwaffe, allowing bombers
sow chaos and destruction in the ranks of the Red Army, which is not
could oppose well-coordinated
strikes by armored vehicles and the air force.
Victory in eight weeks

The main weight of the offensive fell on the northern sector. where 50 infantry, 13 tank and nine motorized divisions operated, with the Army Group Center being the strongest of the two formations. Under the command of the cold aristocrat, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, there were two combined arms armies - the 9th and 4th - and two tank formations - Panzergruppe 3 (3rd Panzer Group) of General Hermann Goth and Panzergruppe 2 (2nd Panzer Group) General Heinz Guderian. The commanders of these armies intended to eclipse the military achievements of Napoleon, who set out on the same road 129 years earlier, as they expected to reach Moscow in less than eight weeks, destroying the Soviet army in the process.

Hitler cheered up the military, declaring: "We only need to knock loudly on the front door, and the whole rotten building of the Russians will collapse and fall apart!" Guderian's first task was to cross the river Bug with his panzer group on both sides of the Brest Fortress, take possession of the object and immediately advance in the direction of the city of Minsk, turning towards it from the south to connect with the units on the points of the Goth offensive wedges moving from the north, which would allow to surround the Soviet troops in a huge cauldron. After the supply runs out, they will have no alternative to surrender.

Command optimism

The task was completed in five days of dizzying cross-country, which obviously confirmed Hitler's predictions and justified the optimism of the Wehrmacht leadership. On the afternoon of June 27, the lead tanks of the 17th tank division broke into Minsk to meet there with their comrades from Panzergruppe 3 Gota, who covered more than 300 km in five days and reached the goals of the initial stage of the operation.

However, in their rear they left "sacks" with Soviet soldiers, who, unlike the enemy troops, also trapped by the Germans a year ago in France, showed no great inclination to lay down their arms and surrender. There were four "pockets" in total: the Brest Fortress, six divisions in the Bialystok region, the same number near Volkovysk and the next 15 between Novogrudok and Minsk itself. The task of first tying them up in battles, then destroying them as a coherent force and capturing them was given to the German infantry of the 4th and 9th armies, marching along dusty roads far behind the lines of the swift panzer divisions.

It is not surprising that disagreements arose in the command. Guderian and Goth were convinced of the need for an immediate further advance, first to Smolensk, and then to Moscow, believing that speed would play a decisive role in the campaign. On the verge of insubordination and rebellion. On July 1, Guderian and Goth gave the command to the tank units to act in the direction of the next target, the Berezina River, for which their immediate superior, General Ponter von Kluge, threatened them with a court tribunal. On the same day, Guderian's tankers first encountered Soviet T-34 tanks that got in their way, which delayed them for three hours, knocking out five PzKpfw IIIs. It was possible to eliminate the barrier only by attacking from the rear with the famous 88-mm cannons. Fortunately for the Germans, they did not come across any more T-34s in this area, and then on July 3 the turn came to perform tasks in the next stage of the operation. So, from his "illegal" bridgehead (beach bridgehead) on the Berezina, Guderian sent the 18th Panzer Division in the direction of the Dnieper River, to which the Germans reached on July 5th.

Over the next three weeks, Panzergruppe 2 had to fight the hardest battles since the beginning of the war, because although the advanced units of the 29th motorized division reached Smolensk on July 16, fierce battles continued in their rear, and besides, there was no spearhead of the offensive for Panzergruppe 3 Gotha and in sight. In the next 10 days, Panzergruppe 2 had three separate tasks: to block and contain the Soviet troops, which they had bypassed since the crossing of the Dnieper, preventing them from breaking through to the south or east; look for a way to connect with Panzergruppe 3, making its way from the northwest; and expand their bridgehead east of Smolensk (towards Roslavl and the Desna River in the Yelnya region) in order to prepare starting positions for a final throw to Moscow. On July 29, Hitler's adjutant, Colonel Schmundt, arrived at Guderian's headquarters with congratulations from the Fuhrer and oak leaves for the Knight's Cross (Guderian was only the fifth person in the army to receive such an award), but he also brought something less pleasant. The High Command intended to correct plans. Moscow ceased to be so important for some time, while the vast fields of Ukraine beckoned with the prospect of becoming the breadbasket of the growing alliance of the Axis countries, the army would need its bread, as well as Baku oil, to the fields of which, after the capture of Ukraine, there would be very little to go .

Moscow will wait. For now, Guderian will have to forget about moving east.

A German officer gives the command to attack with a whistle.
Soviet fur hats and felt boots have become very
popular details of uniforms among German
soldier when the long and cruel Russian winter came.
Chronology

Guderian, the man who invented the blitzkrieg, was able to successfully test his theories in the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. Panzergruppe 2 under his command covered the distance from Russian border and to Smolensk - about 650 km - a little more than two months.

1941

22nd of June
German troops invade the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa. Panzergruppe 2, or Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which is part of the Army Group Center, was instructed to advance in the direction of Moscow along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow highway. While Panzergruppe 2 attacked directly along the highway, General Hoth's Panzergruppe 3 went south from Grodno, carrying out an enveloping maneuver against Gorodishche and Minsk.

June 29
Panzergruppe 2 and Panzergruppe 3 are connected in the Minsk region. Huge concentrations of Russian troops are surrounded in the area of ​​​​Brest-Litovsk, Bialystok, Volkovysk, Gorodishche, and now also Minsk itself, in the latter case, 15 Soviet divisions are in the ring.

July 1
The troops of Guderian and Goth force the Berezina River 80 km east of Minsk and resume the onslaught in the direction of Vitebsk and Smolensk.

3 July
Both Panzergruppe 2 and Panzergruppe 3 are included in the German 4th Army of General Ponter von Kluge.

July 9
The resistance of the Soviet troops in the encirclement is broken, Minsk is occupied by the Germans. General Hoth's Panzergruppe 3 attacks north towards Vitebsk, while Guderian rushes in a straight line towards Mogilev and Smolensk. July 10 Guderian crosses the Dnieper River less than 80 km from Smolensk.

Five Russian citizens hanged near the city of Velizh
in the Smolensk region. According to rough estimates, during
war killed 20-25 million Soviet people.
July 13
The Soviet 19th and 20th armies retreat to Smolensk, sharing responsibility for the defense of the city with the 16th army.

July 16
The 29th motorized division from the Guderian group captures Smolensk. While Panzergruppe 3, which had already captured Vitebsk, launched a blow in the direction of Yartsevo, Guderian's units had to repel the flank counter-attacks of the 4th and 13th armies of Marshal Timoshenko along the Sozh River. It is possible to put an end to the threat in this area no earlier than July 22.

July 17-25
The number of Soviet troops in the pocket in the Smolensk-Vitebsk-Mogilev region reaches 25 divisions. The Panzergruppe Guderian and Goth surround the enemy forces east of Smolensk and begin to compress the encirclement. Poorly coordinated attempts by the Russians to break through the encirclement on July 22 fail, and by July 24 the ring is completely closed.

July 19
The directive of the OKSH (high command of the armed forces of Germany) ordered the Panzergruppe of the 2nd and 2nd Army, after the destruction of the Soviet units in the Smolensk region, to turn south to defeat the Russian armies near Kyiv. Guderian resents this order, believing that the attack on Moscow should remain a priority. Many later expressed the opinion that, having decided to turn the troops to the south, Hitler made a fatal mistake, as a result of which he failed to take Moscow and himself paved the way for the defeat of the Germans.

5th of August
All pockets of resistance in the Smolensk pocket were eventually crushed. The Soviets suffer a crushing defeat. The 16th and 20th armies are virtually wiped off the face of the earth, 300,000 Soviet soldiers are taken prisoner. The volumes of materiel inherited by the Germans are enormous, suffice it to say about 3200 captured tanks and 3100 artillery pieces. This is not the first acquisition, previous successful encirclement booms brought the winners, in addition to 300,000 Soviet prisoners, 2,500 armored units and about 1,500 guns.


Nenets soldiers during street fighting. Medium tank Pzkpfw (Panzer Kampfwagen) III on the right
initially armed with 37s, and then with a 50-mm 1/42 cannon. However, their shots were
unable to penetrate the inclined armor protection of the Soviet T-34, as a result of which
the designers re-equipped the machine with a 50-mm KwK 39 L / 60 gun
(60 calibers versus 42) with a longer barrel, which made it possible to increase
the initial velocity of the projectile.
International events

1941

27th of June
Stalin and Churchill agree on the formation of the United Kingdom and Soviet Union alliance to defeat Hitler.

July 1
In the US, all young people over the age of 21 are required to register to be drafted into the armed forces in the event of hostilities.

July 2
Japan begins mass conscription into the armed forces. Thus, more than a million people are under arms, at least half are destined for participation in operations in China.

July 6
Over 2,500 Jews are killed by German-led Lithuanian militias. Lithuanian Jews and other citizens are subjected to constant acts of barbarism by parts of the SS.

26 July
As a measure against Japanese activities in French Indochina, the United Kingdom and the United States are freezing £33 million of Japanese assets. Such moves had a huge impact on the size of Japanese imports, reducing oil purchases alone by 80 percent.

July 30
The American gunboat "Tutuila" falls under the bombs of a Japanese aircraft, however, later the Japanese authorities apologize.

"How Kolya stopped the German tank group of Guderian. Or one soldier in the field, even if he is not Russian"

(Based on true events)

Probably many have heard the story of a lone artilleryman who met in a deadly duel with a tank column of General Guderian in the early morning of July 17, 1941 on the Warsaw highway near the village of Sokolnichi, which is not far from the Belarusian city of Krichev. The name of that Russian guy was Kolya. Kolya Sirotinin from the city of Orla. The hero died, but managed to delay the enemy for several hours and inflict serious damage on him in terms of manpower and equipment.

Our story will also be about Nicholas. He also delayed the German mechanized group for several hours. The most interesting thing is that he did it in the same place, on the Warsaw highway near the same village of Sokolnichi. Even more surprising is that our Nikolai accomplished his feat on the same early summer morning on July 17, 1941. Perhaps we are talking about the same person? No, different ones. And our history has two main differences.

Firstly, our story actually happened, and not as another, well-known, but fictional.

Secondly, our Nikolai remained alive.

**************

By July 15-16, 1941, a threatening situation was created on the Western Front in the Mogilev region. Several Soviet divisions from 13A, 20A and 4A did their best to hold back the onslaught of the 24th and 46th motorized corps from the 2nd tank group General Heinz Guderian rushing to Smolensk. However, the situation did not develop in favor of the Soviet troops. Taking advantage of the weakness of our defense, the enemy broke through the front near Mogilev in several places. Three armored wedges - the 10th Panzer Division north of Mogilev, the 3rd Panzer in the center and the 4th Panzer to the south - aimed their converging blows in the direction of Krichev.

Realizing the real threat of encirclement, the command of the Western Front began a hasty withdrawal of troops across the river. Sozh. The only road for the retreating units to the saving eastern coast ran through the bridges in Krichev. A huge number of our troops rushed there.

The German command, building on success, embarked on decisive actions, the purpose of which was to quickly capture Krichev, encircle a group of Soviet troops and prevent their withdrawal to new lines of defense. The pragmatic Germans believed that it was much more convenient to smash our encircled troops in a pocket than to face them again, but already at a new line of defense, which was deployed along the eastern bank of the Sozh. Therefore, the German command gave the order: " An attack on Krichev must be carried out without regard to the time of day, and if necessary, even before the arrival of all subordinate units ...».

One of the main tasks of capturing Krichev was assigned by the command of the 24th motorized corps to the 4th tank division, advancing from the south-west along the western bank of the Sozh along the Varshavskoe highway. The choice of the direction of the main attack on Krichev was determined by the favorable situation prevailing in this area.

***********

On July 15, the forward units of the 4th Panzer Division (this was the strike group of Colonel Heinrich Eberbach as part of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th Tank Regiment and the 7th Reconnaissance Battalion) captured the bridges across the Pronya River with a sudden blow and pushed back the defending Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Sozh. In essence, the road to Krichev was open, it was only about 50 km away and, according to intelligence, there were no large enemy forces ahead. However, Colonel Eberbach was in no hurry. Forcing events was hindered by several serious reasons.

Artillery, infantry and auxiliary units lagged behind due to the high rate of advance. Because of this, there was no one and nothing to restore the bridge across the river, blown up during the retreat by the Soviet troops. Lobuchanka. But there was another very important reason - technical condition tanks. For about a week, it was not possible to carry out the necessary maintenance and repair of armored vehicles. The division command makes a decision: since the bridge over the Lobuchanka will be ready no earlier than July 16, the forced delay will be spent on a qualitative reinforcement of the strike group. Having decided to sacrifice the tanks that played the role of a "steel roller", the command of the division withdraws the 1st battalion of the 35th tank regiment from the strike group to carry out urgent technical work. Only the 2nd battalion remains in the Eberbach campfgruppe, and it was decided to give the main role for breaking the enemy defenses to artillery, which, along with other units, is already on the way.

July 16 at 15:00 (hereinafter local time) received regular reports from air reconnaissance and mobile patrols of the 7th reconnaissance battalion. They reported that the Russian units in several motorized and foot columns were withdrawing along secondary roads in an easterly direction towards Krichev. In the city itself, a concentration of enemy troops was discovered.

The command of the 4th division understands that it is impossible to delay and on July 16 at 19h. 30 minutes. Kampfgruppe moved to Krichev. It consists of: 2nd battalion of the 35th tank regiment, 1st company of the 34th motorcycle battalion, 2nd battalion of the 12th rifle regiment, 1st and 3rd divisions of the 103rd artillery regiment, 79th 1st Pioneer Battalion, parts of the pontoon division, one heavy and one light anti-aircraft battery.

Behind the already restored bridge across the Lobuchanka, it is only 10 km from it to the village of Cherikov, and there some 25 km along an excellent highway to the main goal - Krichev. But almost immediately we had to move off the main road, because in the forest through which the highway went, an impenetrable blockage several hundred meters long was made by the retreating Soviet units. When going around it, there was a short skirmish with enemy infantry.

At 22h. 15 minutes. tanks of the 35th regiment managed to capture the bridge across the river intact. Udoga. Kampfgrupp entered Cherikov - the last settlement before Krichev. It was quiet in Cherikov. The local population was not seen. Russian soldiers taken prisoner on the outskirts of the village reported that their units retreated in the direction of Krichev. Here the Kampfgruppe makes the last stop and waits for its last reinforcement reserve - the 1st battalion of the 33rd rifle regiment, the 740th artillery battalion of 15-cm guns, the 6th battery of the 604th division of heavy 21-cm mortars, the 69th artillery regiment 10 cm guns and the 324th battery of spotters. Now the Kampfgruppe of Oberst Heinrich Eberbach is completely ready to attack Krichev.

***************

The echelon, with the last units of the 137th Infantry Division, unloaded four days ago 60 km west of Krichev. There was only one task - to find and join the main forces of the native 137th Infantry Division. And the 137th SD, being part of the 13th Army, by that time was already in the thick of the war. The first echelons with its units arrived at the Orsha station on June 29th. On July 5, parts of the division took part in short skirmishes with the enemy, and on the morning of July 13, its real baptism of fire took place. On this day of his first battle with. Chervonny Osovets, the 137th SD repelled all enemy attacks and did not retreat a single step.

But the 2nd Battalion knew nothing of this. In the frontal confusion, he never managed to find his division, and now, having merged with the retreating units, he went east to Krichev. In the city, the army command detains the battalion and sends it to the defense of the southwestern outskirts.

On July 16, the 2nd Security Guard of the 409th Regiment under the command of Captain Kim took up defenses about four kilometers west of Krichev, near the village of Sokolnichi. The battalion has six hundred men, four 45-mm anti-tank guns and twelve machine guns. In the evening of the same day, a tractor appeared on the highway, pulling a 122-mm howitzer. The tractor had a broken radiator and it dragged slowly, with difficulty. The gunners asked to be taken in.

At the end of the day, the last passenger car passed along the empty highway towards the city. The captain sitting in it said that the Germans would be here in the morning. A short summer night has come...

In the morning, the battalion was to take its first battle in this war.

**********************

July 17 at 3 p.m. 15 minutes. the Kampfgruppen of Colonel Eberbach moved in the direction of Krichev. The first two hours of the march passed quietly. At 5:15 a.m., a report was received from the head group: “ At the exit from the forest near the mark 156 (this is about a couple of kilometers before reaching Sokolnichi), the enemy defenses were discovered. Anti-tank guns, artillery.»

From the memoirs of F. E. Petrov, gunner of the 45-millimeter gun of the battery of the 2nd battalion of the 409th rifle regiment:

« They appeared before dawn, and we immediately opened fire on them.»

The head reconnaissance and patrol group from the 79th Pioneer Battalion, consisting of Pz.I light tanks and SdKfz 251/12 armored personnel carriers, having found the battalion's entrenched defenses, also returned fire. The task of the group was very important - reconnaissance in force. It was necessary to pinpoint the enemy's strongholds and firing points as accurately as possible, to determine their coordinates and landmarks.

Petrov F. E.: " I saw a tank approaching the bridge. He fired tracer shells, saw how they flew at us. The second gun was also fired. I don’t remember how many shells I fired, I felt blood flowing down my face - when I rolled back, the metal part of the sight above my eye hit. I reported to the commander of the gun, Krupin, that I could not shoot, and he himself stood behind the gun. I sat in a ditch, an explosion - and I was covered with earth. They dug me up when the shooting subsided, bandaged me. They changed their position, tanks were waiting again, but they were not there ...»

The reconnaissance and patrol group, having completed its task, retreated 2 km back. Target coordinates were transferred to the main group. Colonel Eberbach takes out his main trump card - artillery. Having deployed it, the Kampfgruppe from heavy guns dealt a powerful fire attack on the defense positions of the Soviet battalion.

The commander of the 2nd battalion realized that the forces were too unequal. The enemy artillery is somewhere beyond the forest, beyond the reach of our magpies. We also recall that its basis was the tools of large hummingbirds. There was only one thing left - to save the battalion from destruction.

Petrov F. E: " At about 8-9 in the morning, the battalion commander ordered to retreat. Our retreat was observed by a German aircraft. The guns were the last to leave, covering the infantry

9 o'clock 30 minutes. Eberbach, making sure that the defenders left their positions, ordered to turn off his artillery and again moved along the highway to the city. Just before Krichev, the Kampfgruppe made a short last stop. There were battles in a large settlement, so a regrouping of forces was necessary. Now the tanks of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Tank Regiment were ahead, moving in two columns on both sides of the highway. They were supported by the 1st company of the 34th motorcycle battalion and the 1st company of the 12th rifle regiment with the task of clearing the streets from pockets of resistance. At 12:30, without encountering serious resistance, the Germans entered the city of Krichev.

Petrov F.E.: " Our calculation took up a position on the main street, on the right side of the roadway, the second gun was installed on another street, as they were waiting for tanks on the road from the Chausy station. After some time, two more horse-drawn guns appeared from another unit, the adjutant of the battalion commander ordered these crews to take up the defense as well. They stood in front of my gun. A few minutes passed, shelling began, a lorry rushed by, an unfamiliar commander standing on the bandwagon shouted that they were following him german tanks. I saw how the shells hit the guns in front, how the fighters fell down there. Our platoon leader, seeing this, ordered to retreat. He fired the last shell, and ran down the street, under the whistle of bullets. There were three of us, ran into the yard, from there through the garden into the ravine. I no longer saw the gun commander and platoon commander, what happened to the second gun - I don’t know either.»

The advanced tank groups reached the station and the bridges across the Sozh, but the retreating Soviet units managed to blow them up. Two of them, apparently, blew up units of the 73rd regiment of the 24th division of the NKVD. One was blown up by Captain Kim's battalion during the retreat.

From the memoirs of Larionov S.S., commander of a machine-gun company of the 2nd battalion of the 409th rifle regiment, a retired captain:

« Leaving, we blew up the bridge. I remember he went up, and there was still a Red Army soldier with a rifle on him .... By this time, I had seven machine guns left in my company ...»

Krichev fell. By the evening of July 17, units of the Kampfgruppen had advanced about 20 more kilometers northward and, near the village of Molyavichi, joined units of the 3rd Panzer Division. Chaussky cauldron slammed shut. Heavy fighting began both inside the pocket and along the entire line along the Sozh River. But that's another story.

*****************

The 2nd Battalion of the 409th Infantry Regiment, in its first battle against the most powerful enemy grouping, completed its task. The battalion delayed the advancing strike group for several hours, which saved many lives. Further fate fighters of the 2nd SB was not easy. The remnants of the battalion joined the 7th Airborne Brigade and continued to fight shoulder to shoulder with Zhadov's paratroopers. Someone like F.E. Petrov, was captured near Krichev, someone like S.S. Larionov, went through the whole war. Someone, and they were the majority, died. S.S. Larionov recalled that very soon he had 12-14 people left in his company ...

Unfortunately, in this story there was no place for the legendary Russian lone artilleryman Nikolai Sirotinin, who allegedly single-handedly stopped the German tank column, inflicting monstrous losses in manpower and equipment. German documents do not contain even hints on this occasion. The lists of losses in the 2nd Panzer Group for July 17 confirm only one officer killed in the units that were part of Colonel Eberbach's Kampfgruppe. There were no lost tanks either. Yes, this is understandable if you carefully study the very nature of the battle. Tanks in that battle on the Warsaw highway simply did not participate. Everything was decided by artillery and well-coordinated interaction of all units of the Kampfgruppe. In 1941, we still had nothing to oppose to this monstrous German car blitzkrieg. The war has just begun...

As for Nikolai Sirotinin, then, most likely, he is the hero of a folk legend. No truthful documents on his existence, and even more so on participation in that battle, have not been found to date.

*************

And the last. And yet in our history was Nikolai. And not a mythical, but a real warrior who really delayed the German strike group of the 4th Panzer Division near the village of Sokolnichi on July 17, 1941 for how many hours. True, he did this not alone, but with his battalion. And he was far from Russian by nationality.

It's time to open the veil of time that hid this man from us. Meet.

Nikolai Andreevich Kim (Chong Phung).

By nationality - Korean.

It was he who commanded the 2nd Rifle Battalion that July morning. It was he who organized the defense on the Warsaw highway. It was he who completed the task and detained the enemy.

Is it possible to call what this commander and his battalion accomplished a feat? It is difficult to unambiguously answer this question. Of course, a beautiful legend about a 19-year-old youth who alone held out for a couple of hours against a steel German avalanche looks much more spectacular. Only now I would like to remind enthusiastic fans of fairy-tale heroes that the real war had nothing to do with fairy tales, in which German fools search for 2 hours in an open field for a cannon firing at direct fire. The steel fist of Heinrich Eberbach would have destroyed a lone cannon without any cover in a few minutes, after his first shot, without even resorting to the help of tanks or artillery. For this, the Kampfgruppe had everything necessary: ​​thugs from assault groups pioneer battalion, capable of taking any armored pillbox with their bare hands, desperate caddies from a motorcycle battalion, single-handedly capturing fortified bridges and holding them until the approach of the main forces. German professionalism and experience could only be countered by your own experience and knowledge.

The soldiers of the 2nd battalion of the 409th regiment were lucky. They entered into their first battle with a mature military commander, behind whom were the events on the CER, the war with the White Finns, the Academy. Frunze. Perhaps it was these qualities of the commander that made it possible to fulfill the combat mission assigned to the battalion.

Nikolai Andreevich Kim fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War from the first to last day. And his autobiography will help to learn more about him.

“The son of a peasant, was born in 1904 in the village of Sinelnikovo, Molotov district of the Far East, from the age of eight he studied at a local rural school (from 1912 to 1916). He graduated from it at the age of twelve. Continued his studies at high school until 1923. From 1923 to 1925 he was engaged in agriculture with his father in his native village.

In autumn 1925 he entered the Moscow Infantry School and graduated in 1928. After graduating from school, he was appointed commander of a platoon of the 107th regiment in the city of Dauria.

In 1931 he received the highest position and was sent as a company commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment of the Stalinist Division. In 1934 he was appointed commander of a training machine-gun company in the same division. In 1935, he was appointed assistant chief of staff of the 2nd Nerchinsk Rifle Regiment of the 1st Pacific Division. In 1936 he was appointed head of the regimental school of the 629th rifle regiment in the mountains. Arzamas at the 17th Infantry Division.

From 1937 to 1940 he studied at the Moscow Academy. Frunze. After graduating from the Academy, in the fall, he was appointed battalion commander in the 409th rifle regiment of the 137th division in the city of Saransk.

With the outbreak of war, he was appointed chief of staff of the 409th regiment in the same division. In September 1941 he was wounded and treated at the Stalingrad hospital. After recovering at the end of 1941, he was appointed chief of staff of the 1169th regiment, which was stationed in the mountains. Astrakhan. In March 1942, he participated in the battles in the Izyum-Voronezh, Kramatorsk, Kharkov areas. In June 1942 he was appointed commander of the 1173 Infantry Regiment of the same division. In the battle near Rostov-on-Don in September 1942 he was wounded and treated in the Makhachkala hospital. After recovery, he was appointed commander of the 1339th Infantry Regiment of the 58th Army.

In the battle near the Arden he was wounded and was treated again in the Makhachkala hospital. After leaving the hospital, he was appointed commander of the 111th Guards Red Banner Regiment of the 46th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Got back to the hospital. From 1944 to 1945, he was commander of the 703rd Infantry Regiment and took part in the battles near Budapest. After the capture of Budapest, he received a direction to Berlin.

In 1945, after the surrender of Germany, our regiment was disbanded, and I was appointed commander of the 323rd Infantry Regiment of the 43rd Division. Our regiment passed through Romania and stopped in the mountains. Odessa. In 1946, the 323rd Rifle Regiment of the 43rd Division occupied the first place in combat training in the Odessa District. For some unknown reason, by order No. 100, I retired.

In the Great Patriotic War he was awarded four Orders of the Red Banner of War and the Order of the Red Star.

Currently, I am the Deputy Director for Political Affairs at the Rybokombinat. Mikoyan Glavkamchatskprom. I live in the Kamchatka region, Ust-Bolsheretsky district, Rybokombinat them. Mikoyan.

Guard Lieutenant Colonel KIM N.A.

April 15, 1949

Nikolai Andreevich died on December 7, 1976. The city of Bikin buried him with full military honors.

Used materials.

  1. Hans Scha "ufler. Knight" s Cross Panzers: The German 35th Tank Regiment In World War II. 2010.
  2. Thomas Hagman. Med 4.PzDiv genom Stalinlinjen. FHS, Krigsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2002.
  3. V. Kiselev. Fellow soldiers. Nizhny Novgorod, 2005

Object coordinates.

The fate of Army Group Center's offensive plan depended to a large extent on the speed and effectiveness of the actions of the two tank groups. Leaving the Brest Fortress to be torn apart by infantry, the 2nd Panzer Group advanced to positions north and south of Brest. Guderian recalled: “On the fateful day of June 22, 1941 at 2:10 am. morning I went to command post group and climbed an observation tower south of Bogukaly (15 km northwest of Brest). I arrived there at 3:10 when it was dark. At 3 o'clock 15 min. our artillery preparation began. At 3 o'clock 40 min. - the first raid of our dive bombers. At 4 o'clock 15 min. the crossing of the Bug by the advanced units of the 17th and 18th tank divisions began. At 4 hours 45 min. the first tanks of the 18th Panzer Division crossed the river. During the crossing, vehicles already tested in the preparation of the Sea Lion plan were used. The tactical and technical data of these machines allowed them to overcome water lines up to 4 m deep.

Then, in the early morning of June 22, Heinz Guderian hardly really considered the coming day fatal. Any forebodings later described were slyness. German military leaders were confident in their strengths and abilities. Behind them were loud victories. The first hours of the "campaign to the East", moreover, did not yet inspire fear. On the contrary, at first the success even exceeded the wildest expectations.

The underwater tanks, of course, gave the invading forces a significant advantage. The moment of surprise was used by them to the full. The division of "diving" tanks already at 8.15 on June 22 breaks through to an important crossing over the Lesna River east of the Bug and captures it intact. About another crossing through Lesna, air reconnaissance reports: “Destroyed!” However, the "divers" at 9.45 refute this report, capturing the crossing intact. Unlike the Soviet special amphibious tanks T-37 and even T-40, German tanks of a similar purpose were alterations of linear vehicles. Therefore, they had all the combat capabilities of the usual "triples" and "fours", including the ability to fully engage in battle with tanks. This was needed very soon: on the way of the forward detachments of the 18th Panzer Division appeared soviet tanks. With battles they made their way to the town of Pelishchi. As it was stated in the XXXXVII Corps combat log, on the way they "defeated several enemy tank detachments numbering up to 40 tanks." It was the vanguard of the Soviet 30th Panzer Division S.I. Bogdanov. The bulk of the formation advanced to the general assembly point of the divisions of the Oborin corps in Zhabinka, so the first tank battle was more like a breakdown of the forces of the parties. However, an interim report from Army Group Center stated that the 18th Panzer Division "repulsed a strong Russian tank attack."

In the same way as in other directions, the beginning of the offensive of the formations of the Guderian group south of Brest took place in "artillery silence". The 3rd Panzer Division of the XXIV Motorized Corps also had "diving" tanks. However, her commander, Walter Model, the future field marshal, did not rely on technology. He obtained permission from Guderian to seize the bridge even before the first shots were fired. Model formed a group of sappers and infantry, which was supposed to cross the bridge even before the start of artillery preparation. The expectation of a surprise attack was fully justified. Already at 3.11, the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Group was informed that the bridge had been captured. The combat log of the 3rd Panzer Division stated: “The Kleemann Group reports that the impression of the enemy is “zero”. Only a single artillery shot in the area of ​​​​the Coden bridge. She is echoed by the magazine of the neighboring 4th Panzer Division: "There is little Russian artillery, no Russian aviation." The offensive was resisted only 3–4 km east of the Bug.

Historical events are often driven forward by a chain of accidents and actions, the real effect of which their participants do not know or even imagine. Moreover, momentary assessment of events can be directly opposite to their actual effect. The negative experience of Heinz Guderian in the assault on the Brest Fortress in September 1939 forced him to plan a double detour. Instead of a swift breakthrough along the highway, his two motorized corps were forced to wade through difficult terrain in all respects to the north and south of Brest.

Cheerfully starting on the morning of June 22 "for health", the 2nd Panzer Group began to quickly stray to "for peace." To the north of Brest, crossings over the Bug were built by noon, but the access roads to them became a bottleneck. The paths leading from paved roads to the crossing points passed through a swampy lowland. Under the tracks and wheels of dozens of vehicles, they rapidly deteriorated. Tractors of the 17th Panzer Division were forced to pull out and pull stuck trucks to the crossing along the road, which allowed movement in only one direction. In the evening, at the crossing of the same division, a bridge breaks under the tank, which immediately stops the crossing for five hours. The "diving" tanks that have burst forward into Soviet territory are left without refueling and replenishment of ammunition. The combat log of the XXXXVII Corps stated: "By the late evening of June 22, only a small part of both divisions crossed the Bug." One can imagine how annoyed Guderian was, having spent the entire first half of the day just in the Lemelsen corps. The commander of Army Group Center also went there. The struggle with the terrain at the crossings took place before his eyes.

The situation in the XXIV motorized corps south of Brest was no better, and in some ways even worse. From the memoirs of Guderian, a perverse and too blissful picture of the first day of the war may emerge. He writes: “The surprise attack on the enemy was achieved on the entire front of the tank group. To the west of Brest-Litovsk (Brest), the 24th Panzer Corps captured all the bridges across the Bug, which turned out to be in perfect working order. What conclusion can be drawn from this phrase? The answer is obvious - after the capture of the bridges, the formations of the corps moved forward non-stop. However, it is not. The captured bridges were sufficient for the crossing of motorized infantry, as well as light artillery. For tanks, it was still necessary to build 16-ton bridges. As Guderian used to say in another of his works, "victory follows in the footsteps of the tanks." Therefore, the entire morning of June 22 was spent building bridges for them. Despite the fact that hostilities began at 3.15 am on June 22, the crossing of tanks across the freshly built bridge of the 4th Panzer Division does not begin until 10.30 am. It stretches into the middle and second half of the day for the same reason as in the XXXXVII corps - bad roads on the coast at the approaches to the crossings. In some places on sandy roads, cars had to be towed one by one.

However, even after the tanks managed to be transported across the Bug with great difficulty, the victory was in no hurry to follow in the footsteps of the “triples” and “fours” of the XXIV Corps. Attempts by Model's 3rd Panzer Division to follow the original offensive plan failed. They had to be abandoned due to the impassability of the roads designated in the plan. Swamps and overflowing streams stood in the way of tanks and vehicles. I had to look for other routes. The division began advancing to Brest, accompanied by constant clashes with scattered Soviet units, including the tanks of the ill-fated 22nd Panzer Division. The 4th Army did not have large forces here, but the terrain favored the defense of even small detachments. Further, the 3rd Panzer bypassed Brest from the south and went east of the city to the Warsaw highway. Thus, Model ended up on the route assigned to the neighboring 4th Panzer Division. The latter was locked up for a long time in the first half of the day by the center of resistance of the Soviet troops. Despite all the orders and prohibitions, the principle “whoever got up first, that slippers” often operates in war. Model reached the highway earlier, and corps commander Geyer von Schweppenburg was forced to sanction a change in offensive plan. As a result, two large tank formations moved in single file along the same road. It could be expected that Model's division, which had jumped out onto the highway, would begin a non-stop advance forward.

However, the troubles of the 3rd Panzer Division did not end there. At 4:50 p.m., aerial reconnaissance reported that the bridge over the Mukhavets near Bulkovo (southeast of Zhabinka) was on fire. The battle log of the formation noted that this bridge "is of tremendous importance to the division." It was already getting dark when the head of a giant steel snake from two divisions reached Mukhavets. By that time, only smoking firebrands remained from the wooden bridge. Bridge Park is late, stuck somewhere in the endless traffic jams behind. Further progress had to be stopped. Through Mukhavets in the late evening, around 22.00, only "diving" tanks move. They moved to Kobrin, but it was rather a forceful reconnaissance than an offensive.

Colonel Horst Sobel, who in 1941 commanded a tank platoon in the Model division, recalled with annoyance: "We covered only 18 kilometers, while we had to go 80 kilometers!" In the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Division, even a phrase breathing envy appears: “The Panzer divisions moving north of Brest are advancing rapidly, without encountering the obstacles that fall on the share of the 3rd and 4th tank divisions.” However, it must be said that Guderian himself seemed to be unenthusiastic about the prospects of an offensive south of Brest - he spent the whole day in the XXXXVII corps, and did not even look into the XXIV. The infantry divisions of the XII Army Corps, with all their efforts, could not develop an offensive pace comparable to the mechanical units. Guderian himself did not comment on the modest results of the advance of his tank group on the first day of the war. Moreover, in his memoirs, he wittingly or unwittingly attributed the success of the next day to his troops. Summing up the results of the first day of fighting, he casually remarked: "At Pruzhany, the 18th Panzer Division entered into the first battles with enemy tanks." In fact (according to corps reports) this first tank battle took place near the town of Pelishche, far to the west of Pruzhany. Moreover, in the late night report of Army Group Center on the results of daytime battles, Poddubno is indicated as an achievement of the 18th Panzer Division, which is also not Pruzhany at all, but noticeably to the west. In a word, the “fast Heinz” on June 22 was not at all as fast as usual. Von Bock was candid in his diary: “We are moving forward; Panzergruppe Gotha succeeded the most in this respect, and in the evening came under the direct command of the army group. Things are far from going so smoothly for Guderian's tank group. The problems at the crossings near Brest are the same as those of the Lemelsen corps - they make it difficult to deliver fuel.” The 2nd Panzer Group debuted without resounding success, and throwing large Soviet reserves against it could quickly turn Guderian into an outsider. It all depended on what move his opponent would make.