Scattering of the shells of weapons of the Second World War. Overview of small arms ammunition encountered at the sites of former battles of the European part of the USSR

The cumulative effect of a directional explosion became known as early as the 19th century, shortly after the mass production of high explosives began. The first scientific work on this issue was published in 1915 in Great Britain.

This effect is achieved by shaping explosive charges. Usually for this purpose, charges are made with a recess in the part opposite to its detonator. When an explosion is initiated, a converging flow of detonation products is formed into a high-speed cumulative jet, and the cumulative effect increases when the recess is lined with a metal layer (1-2 mm thick). The speed of the metal jet reaches 10 km / s. Compared to the expanding detonation products of conventional charges, in the converging flow of shaped charge products, the pressure and density of matter and energy are much higher, which ensures the directed action of the explosion and a high penetrating force of the shaped charge.

When the conical shell collapses, the velocities of individual parts of the jet turn out to be somewhat different; as a result, the jet is stretched in flight. Therefore, a slight increase in the gap between the charge and the target increases the penetration depth due to the elongation of the jet. The thickness of armor pierced by HEAT shells does not depend on the firing range and is approximately equal to their caliber. At significant distances between the charge and the target, the jet breaks into pieces, and the penetration effect decreases.

In the 30s of the XX century, there was a massive saturation of troops and armored vehicles. In addition to the traditional means of dealing with them, in the pre-war period, cumulative projectiles were being developed in some countries.
It was especially tempting that the penetration of such ammunition did not depend on the speed of meeting the armor. This made it possible to successfully use them to destroy tanks in artillery systems that were not originally intended for this, as well as create highly effective anti-tank mines and grenades. Germany advanced the most in the creation of cumulative anti-tank ammunition; by the time of the attack on the USSR, cumulative artillery shells of 75-105-mm caliber were created and adopted there.

Unfortunately, in the Soviet Union before the war, this direction was not given due attention. In our country, the improvement of anti-tank weapons went by increasing the calibers of anti-tank guns and increasing the initial speeds of armor-piercing shells. For the sake of fairness, it should be said that in the USSR at the end of the 30s, an experimental batch of 76-mm cumulative shells was fired and tested by firing. During the tests, it turned out that cumulative projectiles equipped with standard fuses from fragmentation shells, as a rule, do not penetrate armor and give ricochets. Obviously, it was a matter of fuses, but the military, who already did not show much interest in such projectiles, after unsuccessful firing, finally abandoned them.

At the same time, a significant number of recoilless (dynamo-reactive) Kurchevsky guns were manufactured in the USSR.

Kurchevsky's 76-mm recoilless gun mounted on a truck chassis

The advantage of such systems is their low weight and lower cost in comparison with the "classic" tools. Recoilless systems in combination with cumulative shells could quite successfully prove themselves as anti-tank shells.

With the outbreak of hostilities, reports began to arrive from the fronts that German artillery was using previously unknown so-called "armor-burning" shells that effectively hit tanks. When inspecting the wrecked tanks, they drew attention to the characteristic type of holes with melted edges. At first, a version was expressed that unknown shells used "fast-burning termite", accelerated by powder gases. However, experimentally, this assumption was soon refuted. It was found that the processes of combustion of thermite incendiary compounds and the interaction of a jet of slags with the metal of the tank's armor proceed too slowly and cannot be realized in a very short time of penetrating the armor by a projectile. At that time, samples of the "armor-burning" shells captured from the Germans were delivered from the front. It turned out that their design is based on the use of the cumulative explosion effect.

At the beginning of 1942, the designers M.Ya. Vasiliev, Z. V. Vladimirova and N.S. Zhitkikh designed a 76-mm cumulative projectile with a conical cumulative recess, lined with a steel shell. The body of an artillery shell with bottom equipment was used, the chamber of which was additionally bored into a cone at its head. A powerful explosive was used in the projectile - an alloy of TNT with RDX. The bottom hole and the plug were used to install an additional detonator and a beam detonator capsule. A big problem was the lack of a suitable fuse in production. After a series of experiments, the AM-6 instantaneous aviation fuse was chosen.

Cumulative shells, which had armor penetration of the order of 70-75 mm, appeared in the ammunition load of regimental guns since 1943, and were mass-produced throughout the war.

Regimental 76-mm gun mod. 1927 g.

Industry supplied the front with about 1.1 million 76-mm cumulative anti-tank shells. Unfortunately, it was forbidden to use them in tank and divisional 76-mm guns due to the unreliable operation of the fuse and the danger of an explosion in the barrel. Fuses for cumulative artillery projectiles, satisfying safety requirements when firing from long-barreled guns, were created only at the end of 1944.

In 1942, a group of designers including I.P. Dziuba, N.P. Kazeykina, I.P. Kucherenko, V. Ya. Matyushkin and A.A. Greenberg developed cumulative anti-tank rounds for 122-mm howitzers.

The 122-mm cumulative projectile for the 1938 model howitzer had a steel cast iron body, was equipped with an effective RDX-based explosive and a powerful PETN detonator. The 122-mm cumulative projectile was equipped with a V-229 instant fuse, which was developed in a very short time at TsKB-22, led by A.Ya. Karpov.

122 mm howitzer M-30 mod. 1938 g.

The shell was put into service, put into mass production at the beginning of 1943, and managed to take part in the Battle of Kursk. Until the end of the war, more than 100 thousand 122-mm HEAT shells were produced. The projectile penetrated armor up to 150 mm thick along the normal, ensuring the defeat of heavy German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". However, the effective range of howitzers at maneuvering tanks was suicidal - 400 meters.

The creation of cumulative shells opened up great opportunities for the use of artillery guns with relatively low initial velocities - 76-mm regimental guns of the 1927 and 1943 models. and 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model, which were in large numbers in the army. The presence of cumulative shells in the ammunition load of these guns significantly increased the effectiveness of their anti-tank fire. This significantly strengthened the anti-tank defense of the Soviet rifle divisions.

One of the main tasks of the Il-2 armored attack aircraft, which was put into service at the beginning of 1941, was the fight against armored vehicles.
However, the cannon armament available to attack aircraft made it possible to effectively hit only lightly armored vehicles.
Reactive 82-132-mm projectiles did not have the required firing accuracy. Nevertheless, cumulative RBSK-82s were developed for armament of the Il-2 in 1942.

The head of the RBSK-82 rocket consisted of a steel cylinder with a wall thickness of 8 mm. A cone of sheet iron was rolled into the front of the cylinder, creating a recess in the explosive that was poured into the cylinder of the projectile head. A tube ran along the center of the cylinder, which served "to transmit a beam of fire from the piercing cap to the TAT-1 detonator cap". The shells were tested in two versions of explosive equipment: TNT and alloy 70/30 (TNT with RDX). Projectiles with TNT had a point for the AM-A fuse, and projectiles with an alloy 70/30 had an M-50 fuse. The fuses had a blast cap of the APUV type. The missile part of the RBSK-82 is standard, from the M-8 rocket shells filled with pyroxylin powder.

In total, during the tests, 40 pieces of RBSK-82 were consumed, of which 18 were fired in the air, the rest were on the ground. Trophy german tanks Pz. III, StuG III and Czech tank Pz.38 (t) with enhanced armor. Shooting in the air was carried out at the StuG III tank from a dive at an angle of 30 ° with volleys of 2-4 shells in one run. The firing distance is 200 m. The shells showed good stability on the flight path, but they did not manage to get a single fall into the tank.

Reactive armor-piercing projectile of cumulative action RBSK-82, equipped with alloy 70/30, pierced armor 30 mm thick at any meeting angles, and pierced armor 50 mm thick at right angles, but did not pierce at a meeting angle of 30 °. Apparently, the low armor penetration is a consequence of the delay in the detonation of the fuse "from a ricochet and the cumulative jet is formed with a deformed cone."

RBSK-82 shells in TNT equipment pierced armor with a thickness of 30 mm only at meeting angles of at least 30 °, and armor of 50 mm was not pierced under any impact conditions. The holes obtained during the through penetration of the armor had a diameter of up to 35 mm. In most cases, the penetration of the armor was accompanied by the spalling of metal around the outlet.

Cumulative RSs were not adopted for service due to the lack of a clear advantage over standard missiles. On the way, there was already a new, much stronger weapon - PTABs.

The priority in the development of small aerial bombs of cumulative action belongs to domestic scientists and designers. In the middle of 1942, the well-known developer of fuses I.A. Larionov, proposed the design of a light anti-tank bomb of cumulative action. The Air Force Command showed interest in the implementation of the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work and tests of the new bomb began at the end of 1942. The final version was PTAB-2.5-1.5, i.e. a cumulative anti-tank aviation bomb weighing 1.5 kg in the dimensions of a 2.5-kg aviation fragmentation bomb. GKO urgently decided to adopt PTAB-2.5-1.5 and organize its mass production.

For the first PTAB-2.5-1.5 housings and riveted pinnacle-cylindrical stabilizers were made of 0.6 mm thick sheet steel. To increase the fragmentation effect, a steel 1.5-mm shirt was additionally put on the cylindrical part of the bomb. The combat charge of the PTAB consisted of a composite BB of the TGA type, equipped through a bottom goggle. To protect the AD-A fuse impeller from spontaneous folding, a special fuse was put on the bomb stabilizer from a square-shaped tin plate with a plug of two wire whiskers attached to it, passing between the blades. After dropping the PTAB from the plane, it was blown off the bomb by the oncoming air flow.

When it hit the tank's armor, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetril detonator bombs, caused a detonation of the explosive charge. During detonation of the charge, due to the presence of a cumulative funnel and a metal cone in it, a cumulative jet was created, which, as shown by field tests, pierced armor up to 60 mm thick at an angle of meeting 30 ° with subsequent destructive action behind the armor: defeat of the tank crew, initiation of ammunition detonation , as well as ignition of fuel or its vapors.

The bomb loading of the Il-2 aircraft included up to 192 PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs in 4 cassettes of small bombs (48 pieces in each) or up to 220 pieces with their rational bulk placement in 4 bomb compartments.

The adoption of PTAB for some time was kept secret, their use without the permission of the high command was prohibited. This made it possible to use the effect of surprise and effectively use new weapons in the battle of Kursk.

The massive use of PTAB had a stunning effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the enemy. By the third year of the war, German tankers, however, like Soviet ones, were already accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of bombing strikes. At the initial stage of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations at all, that is, on the routes of movement in columns, in places of concentration and at their starting positions, for which they were severely punished - the flight path of the PTAB blocked 2-3 tanks, one distance from the other at 60-75 m, as a result of which the latter suffered significant losses, even in the absence of the massive use of IL-2. One IL-2 from a height of 75-100 meters could cover an area of ​​15x75 meters, destroying all enemy equipment on it.
On average, during the war, the irrecoverable losses of tanks from aviation actions did not exceed 5%; after the use of PTAB in certain sectors of the front, this figure exceeded 20%.

Recovering from the shock German tank crews soon passed exclusively to dispersed marching and pre-battle formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the control of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated interaction between them. In the parking lots, German tankers began to place their vehicles under trees, light mesh sheds and install light metal nets over the roof of the tower and hull. The effectiveness of Il-2 strikes with the use of PTAB decreased by about 4-4.5 times, remaining, nevertheless, on average 2-3 times higher than with the use of high-explosive and high-explosive bombs.

In 1944, a more powerful anti-tank bomb PTAB-10-2.5, in the dimensions of a 10-kg aerial bomb, was adopted. It provided penetration of armor up to 160 mm thick. According to the principle of operation and the purpose of the main units and elements, PTAB-10-2.5 was similar to PTAB-2.5-1.5 and differed from it only in shape and dimensions.

In service with the Red Army in the 1920s-1930s, there was a muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

It was a 41-mm mortar, which was worn on the barrel of a rifle, fixing on the front sight with a cutout. On the eve of World War II, a grenade launcher was available in every rifle and cavalry squad. Then the question arose about giving the rifle grenade launcher "anti-tank" properties.

During World War II, in 1944, the VKG-40 cumulative grenade entered service with the Red Army. A grenade was fired with a special blank cartridge with 2.75 g of gunpowder of the VP or P-45 brand. The reduced charge of the blank cartridge made it possible to fire a direct-fire grenade with the butt rest on the shoulder, at a distance of up to 150 meters.

The cumulative rifle grenade is designed to combat lightly armored vehicles and mobile means of the enemy, not protected by armor, as well as firing points. The VKG-40 was used very limitedly, which is explained by the low accuracy of fire and weak armor penetration.

During the war, a significant number of hand-held anti-tank grenades were fired in the USSR. Initially, these were high-explosive grenades, as the thickness of the armor increased, the weight of anti-tank grenades also increased. However, this still did not ensure the penetration of the armor of medium tanks, so the RPG-41 grenade with an explosive weight of 1400 g could penetrate 25 mm armor.

Needless to say, what danger this anti-tank weapon posed to the one who used it.

In the middle of 1943, the Red Army adopted a fundamentally new cumulative grenade RPG-43, developed by N.P. Belyakov. It was the first cumulative hand grenade developed in the USSR.

Hand-held cumulative grenade RPG-43 in the context

The RPG-43 had a flat-bottomed body with a conical lid, a wooden handle with a safety mechanism, a tape stabilizer and a shock-ignition mechanism with a fuse. A bursting charge with a conical shaped recess, lined with a thin layer of metal, and a cup with a safety spring and a sting fixed in its bottom are placed inside the body.

At its front end of the handle there is a metal sleeve, inside of which there are the fuse holder and the pin holding it in the extreme rear position. Outside, a spring is put on the sleeve and fabric bands are laid, which are attached to the stabilizer cap. The safety mechanism consists of a flap and a check. The flap serves to hold the stabilizer cap on the grenade handle before throwing it, preventing it from sliding or turning in place.

During the throw of the grenade, the flap separates and releases the stabilizer cap, which, under the action of a spring, slides off the handle and pulls the ribbons behind it. The safety pin falls out under its own weight, releasing the fuse holder. Due to the presence of the stabilizer, the flight of the grenade took place with its head forward, which is necessary for optimal use of the energy of the shaped charge of the grenade. When the grenade hits the obstacle with the bottom of the case, the fuse, overcoming the resistance of the safety spring, is pricked onto the sting with a detonator cap, which causes the explosive charge to detonate. The shaped charge RPG-43 penetrated armor up to 75 mm thick.

With the advent of German heavy tanks on the battlefield, a hand-held anti-tank grenade with greater armor penetration was required. A group of designers consisting of M.Z. Polevanova, L.B. Ioffe and N.S. Zhitkikh has developed an RPG-6 cumulative grenade. In October 1943, the grenade was adopted by the Red Army. The RPG-6 grenade is in many ways similar to the German PWM-1.

German hand-held anti-tank grenade PWM-1

The RPG-6 had a drop-shaped body with a charge and an additional detonator and a handle with an inertial fuse, a detonator cap and a ribbon stabilizer.

The fuse striker was blocked by a check. The stabilizer strips were placed in the handle and held by a safety bar. The safety pin was removed before throwing. After the throw, the safety bar flew off, the stabilizer pulled out, the drummer's check was pulled out - the fuse was cocked.

Thus, the protection system of the RPG-6 was three-stage (the RPG-43 had two-stage). In terms of technology, an essential feature of the RLG-6 was the absence of turned and threaded parts, the widespread use of stamping and knurling. Compared to the RPG-43, the RPG-6 was more technologically advanced in production and somewhat safer to use. RPG-43 and RPG-6 rushed about 15-20 m, after the throw the fighter should have taken cover.

During the war years in the USSR, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were never created, although work in this direction was carried out. The main anti-tank weapons of the infantry were still anti-tank missiles and anti-tank hand grenades. This was partially offset by a significant increase in the number of anti-tank artillery in the second half of the war. But in an offensive, anti-tank guns could not always accompany the infantry, and in the event of a sudden appearance of enemy tanks, this often led to large and unjustified losses.

Here's a little illustration:

Suppose I read in a 12-volume book (which usually exaggerates the strength of the Germans and satellites opposing us) that by the beginning of 1944 on the Soviet-German front the ratio of forces in artillery and mortars was 1.7: 1 (95.604 Soviet versus 54.570 enemy). More than one and a half overall superiority. That is, in active areas it could be increased to three times (for example, in the Belarusian operation 29,000 Soviet against 10,000 enemy) Does this mean that the enemy could not raise his head under hurricane fire Soviet artillery? No, an artillery piece is just a tool for spending projectiles. There are no shells - and the weapon is a useless toy. And the provision of shells is precisely the task of logistics.

In 2009, at VIF, Isaev posted a comparison of the ammunition consumption of Soviet and German artillery (1942: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1718/1718985.htm, 1943: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/ forum / 0 / archive / 1706 / 1706490.htm, 1944: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/1733/1733134.htm, 1945: http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/ 0 / archive / 1733 / 1733171.htm). I collected everything in a plate, supplemented it with rocket artillery, added to the Germans from Hannah the consumption of trophy calibers (it often gives an indisputable addition) and the consumption of tank calibers for comparability - in Soviet numbers, tank calibers (20-mm ShVAK and 85-mm non-anti-aircraft) are present. I posted it. Well, I grouped it a little differently. It turns out quite amusing. Despite the superiority of the Soviet artillery in the number of barrels, the Germans had more shells in pieces, if we take artillery calibers (i.e., 75-mm and higher guns, without anti-aircraft guns):
USSR Germany 1942 37,983,800 45,261,822 1943 82,125,480 69,928,496 1944 98,564,568 113,663,900
If you translate into tons, then the superiority is even more noticeable:
USSR Germany 1942 446.113 709.957 1943 828.193 1.121.545 1944 1.000.962 1.540.933
Tons here are taken by the weight of the projectile, not the shot. That is, the weight of metal and explosives falling directly on the head of the opposing side. Note that I did not consider the armor-piercing shells of tank and anti-tank guns for the Germans (I hope it is clear why). It is not possible to exclude them for the Soviet side, but, judging by the Germans, the amendment will be insignificant. For Germany, consumption is given on all fronts, which begins to play a role in 1944.

In the Soviet army, on average, 3.6-3.8 shells were fired per day on the barrel of a gun from 76.2 mm and above of the active army (without RGK). The figure is quite stable both by years and by calibers: in 1944 the average daily shot at all calibers was 3.6 per barrel, for a 122-mm howitzer - 3.0, for 76.2 mm barrels (regimental, divisional, tank) - 3.7. The average daily shot on the mortar barrel, on the other hand, grows from year to year: from 2.0 in 1942 to 4.1 in 1944.

For the Germans, I do not have the availability of guns in the army. But if we take the general availability of guns, then the average daily shot on a barrel of 75 mm and higher in 1944 will be about 8.5. At the same time, the main workhorse of divisional artillery (105-mm howitzers - almost a third of the total tonnage of shells) fired an average of 14.5 shells per day per day, and the second main caliber (150-mm divisional howitzers - 20% of the total tonnage) was about 10, 7. Mortars were used much less intensively - 81-mm mortars were fired a day at 4.4 rounds per barrel, and 120-mm only 2.3. Regimental artillery guns gave a consumption closer to the average (75-mm infantry gun 7 rounds per barrel, 150-mm infantry gun - 8.3).

Another instructive metric is ammunition consumption per division.

The division was the main organizational building block, but typically divisions sought out reinforcements. It is interesting to see how the middle division was supported in terms of firepower. In 1942-44, the USSR had in the army in the field (without RGK) about 500 calculated divisions (weighted average number: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). The ground forces of the active army had about 5.5 million, that is, the division had about 11 thousand people. This "had to" is natural, taking into account both the actual composition of the division and all reinforcement and support units that worked for it both directly and in the deep rear.

For the Germans, the average number of troops per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, decreased from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, approximately 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet one. At the same time, the average daily shot on a Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and on a German - three times more (16.2 tons). If you count for 10,000 people in the active army, then from the Soviet side, to support their actions in 1944, 5 tons of ammunition were spent per day, and from the German side, 13.8 tons.

In this sense, the American division in the European theater of operations stands out even more. It had three times as many people as the Soviet: 34,000 (this is without the Supply Command troops), and the daily ammunition consumption was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day for 10,000 people, that is, more than three times more than in the Red Army.

In this sense, it was the Americans who carried out the recommendation of Joseph Vissarionovich "to fight with little blood, but with a large expenditure of shells." It can be compared - in June 1944 the distance to the Elbe was approximately the same from Omaha Beach and from Vitebsk. The Russians and the Americans also reached the Elbe at about the same time. That is, they ensured the same speed of advancement for themselves. However, the Americans spent 15 tons per day per 10,000 personnel on this route and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month in killed, wounded, captured and missing. Soviet troops, advancing at the same speed, spent (in specific) three times less shells, but they also lost 8.5% per month. Those. the speed was provided by the expense of manpower.

It is interesting to see the distribution of the weight consumption of ammunition by types of weapons:

Let me remind you that all the numbers here are for artillery of 75 mm and above, that is, without anti-aircraft guns, without 50-mm mortars, without battalion / anti-tank guns with a caliber of 28 to 57 mm. Infantry guns include German guns with this name, Soviet 76-mm regiments and an American 75-mm howitzer. The rest of the guns with a combat weight of less than 8 tons are counted as field guns. Here, at the upper limit, such systems as the Soviet 152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20 and the German s.FH 18 fall into mm mortar, as well as 152-155-170-mm long-range guns on their carriages fall into the next class - heavy and long-range artillery.

It can be seen that in the Red Army the lion's share of fire falls on mortars and regimental guns, i.e. to fire on the close tactical zone. Heavy artillery plays a very minor role (in 1945, more, but not much). In field artillery, the efforts (by the weight of the projectiles fired) are roughly evenly distributed between the 76mm cannon, 122mm howitzer and 152mm howitzer / howitzer-cannon. Which leads to the fact that average weight the Soviet shell turns out to be one and a half times smaller than the German one.

In addition, it should be noted that the further the target is, the (on average) it is less covered. In the near tactical zone, most of the targets are dug / covered in one way or another, while in the depths there appear such uncovered targets as advancing reserves, enemy troops in places of concentration, headquarters locations, etc. In other words, a projectile hitting the target in depth inflicts more damage on average than a projectile fired along the leading edge (on the other hand, the dispersion of projectiles at long distances is higher).

Then, if the enemy has a parity in the weight of the shells fired, but at the same time keeps half the number of people at the front, thereby he gives half the targets of our artillery.

All this works for the observed loss ratio.

(As a detailed comment to

Everyone is familiar with the popular prints of the Soviet "soldier-liberator". In the minds of the Soviet people, the Red Army men of the Great Patriotic War are emaciated people in dirty greatcoats who run in a crowd to attack after the tanks, or tired elderly men smoking on the breastwork of a hand-rolled trench. After all, it was precisely such shots that were mainly captured by military newsreels. In the late 1980s, filmmakers and post-Soviet historians put the "victim of repression" on a cart, handed the "three-line" without cartridges, sending them to meet the armored hordes of fascists - under the supervision of barrage detachments.

Now I propose to see what happened in reality. We can responsibly declare that our weapons were in no way inferior to foreign ones, while more suited to local conditions of use. For example, a three-line rifle had larger clearances and tolerances than foreign ones, but this "drawback" was a forced feature - weapon grease, thickening in the cold, did not take the weapon out of combat.

N agan- a revolver developed by the Belgian gunsmiths brothers Emil (1830-1902) and Leon (1833-1900) Nagan, which was in service and produced in a number of countries in the late 19th - mid-20th centuries.


TC(Tulsky, Korovina) - the first Soviet serial self-loading pistol. In 1925 sports society Dynamo ordered the Tula Arms Plant to develop a compact pistol chambered for 6.35 × 15 mm Browning for sports and civilian needs.

The work on the creation of the pistol took place in the design bureau of the Tula Arms Plant. In the fall of 1926, the gunsmith designer S.A. Korovin completed the development of a pistol, which was named the TK pistol (Tula Korovin).

At the end of 1926, TOZ began producing a pistol, the next year the pistol was approved for use, receiving the official name "Pistol Tulsky, Korovin, model 1926".

TK pistols entered service with employees of the NKVD of the USSR, middle and senior command personnel of the Red Army, civil servants and party workers.

Also, the TC was used as a gift or award weapon (for example, there are cases of awarding them to the Stakhanovites). In the period from autumn 1926 to 1935, several tens of thousands of Korovins were produced. In the period after the Great Patriotic War, TK pistols were kept for some time in savings banks as a backup weapon for employees and collectors.


Pistol mod. 1933 TT(Tulsky, Tokareva) - the first army self-loading pistol of the USSR, developed in 1930 by the Soviet designer Fyodor Vasilyevich Tokarev. The TT pistol was developed for the 1929 competition for a new army pistol, announced to replace the revolver revolver and several models of foreign-made revolvers and pistols that were in service with the Red Army by the mid-1920s. As a standard cartridge, the German 7.63 × 25 mm Mauser cartridge was adopted, which was purchased in significant quantities for the Mauser S-96 pistols in service.

Mosin rifle. The 7.62 mm (3-line) rifle of the 1891 model (Mosin rifle, three-line) is a magazine rifle adopted by the Russian Imperial Army in 1891.

It was actively used in the period from 1891 to the end of the Great Patriotic War, during this period it was modernized many times.

The name of the three-line comes from the caliber of the rifle barrel, which is equal to three Russian lines (the old measure of length is equal to one tenth of an inch, or 2.54 mm - respectively, three lines are equal to 7.62 mm).

On the basis of a rifle of the 1891 model of the year and its modifications, a number of samples of sporting and hunting weapons, both rifled and smooth-bore, were created.

Simonov automatic rifle. The 7.62 mm automatic rifle of the Simonov system of the 1936 model, the ABC-36 is a Soviet automatic rifle developed by the gunsmith Sergei Simonov.

Originally developed as a self-loading rifle, improvements have added an automatic fire mode for use in an emergency. The first automatic rifle developed in the USSR and put into service.

Tokarev's self-loading rifle. 7.62-mm self-loading rifles of the Tokarev system of the 1938 and 1940 models (SVT-38, SVT-40), as well as the Tokarev automatic rifle of the 1940 model - a modification of the Soviet self-loading rifle developed by F.V. Tokarev.

SVT-38 was developed as a replacement for the Simonov automatic rifle and was adopted by the Red Army on February 26, 1939. The first SVT arr. 1938 was released on July 16, 1939. From October 1, 1939, gross production began at Tula, and from 1940 - at the Izhevsk Arms Plant.

Self-loading carbine Simonov. The 7.62-mm Simonov self-loading carbine (also known abroad as the SKS-45) is a Soviet self-loading carbine designed by Sergei Simonov, entered service in 1949.

The first copies began to arrive in active units at the beginning of 1945 - this was the only case of using the 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge in World War II

Tokarev's submachine gun, or the original name is Tokarev's light carbine - an experimental model of automatic weapons created in 1927 for the modified revolver cartridge of the Nagant, the first of the submachine guns developed in the USSR. It was not adopted for service, it was produced by a small experimental batch, it was used in limited quantities in the Great Patriotic War.

Degtyarev's machine gun. The 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1934, 1934/38 and 1940 Degtyarev systems are various modifications of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet gunsmith Vasily Degtyarev in the early 1930s. The first submachine gun adopted by the Red Army.

The Degtyarev submachine gun was a fairly typical representative of the first generation of this type of weapon. It was used in the Finnish campaign of 1939-40, as well as at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War.

Shpagin's machine gun. The 7.62-mm submachine gun of the 1941 Shpagin system (PPSh) is a Soviet submachine gun developed in 1940 by designer G.S. Shpagin and adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1940. The PPSh was the main submachine gun of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War.

After the end of the war, in the early 1950s, the PPSh was withdrawn from service by the Soviet Army and was gradually replaced with a Kalashnikov assault rifle; for a little longer it remained in service with rear and auxiliary units, units of internal troops and railway troops. It was in service with the paramilitary security units at least until the mid-1980s.

Also, in the post-war period, PPSh was supplied in significant quantities to countries friendly to the USSR, for a long time it was in service with the armies of various states, was used by irregular formations and throughout the twentieth century was used in armed conflicts around the world.

P gun-machine gun Sudaev. 7.62 mm submachine guns of the 1942 and 1943 Sudaev system (PPS) systems are variants of the submachine gun developed by the Soviet designer Alexei Sudaev in 1942. Used by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War.

PPS is often regarded as the best submachine gun of World War II.

Ulemet "Maxim" model 1910. Machine gun "Maxim" model 1910 - a heavy machine gun, a variant of the British Maxim machine gun, widely used by the Russian and Soviet armies during World War I and World War II. The Maxim machine gun was used to engage open group targets and enemy fire weapons at a distance of up to 1000 m.

Anti-aircraft variant
- 7.62-mm quad machine gun "Maxim" on the anti-aircraft mount U-431
- 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun "Maxim" on the anti-aircraft mount U-432

Ulemet Maxim-Tokarev- Soviet light machine gun designed by F.V. Tokarev, created in 1924 on the basis of the Maxim machine gun.

DP(Degtyareva Infantry) - a light machine gun developed by V. A. Degtyarev. The first ten serial DP machine guns were manufactured at the Kovrov plant on November 12, 1927, then a batch of 100 machine guns was transferred to military trials, according to the results of which the machine gun was adopted by the Red Army on December 21, 1927. DP became one of the first samples of small arms created in the USSR. The machine gun was massively used as the main weapon of fire support for the infantry of the platoon-company link until the end of the Great Patriotic War.

DT(Degtyarev tank) - a tank machine gun developed by V.A.Degtyarev in 1929. It entered service with the Red Army in 1929 under the designation "7.62-mm tank machine gun of the Degtyarev system mod. 1929 " (DT-29)

DS-39(7.62-mm heavy machine gun Degtyarev model 1939).

SG-43. 7.62 mm Goryunov machine gun (SG-43) - Soviet easel machine gun. It was developed by the gunsmith P. M. Goryunov with the participation of M. M. Goryunov and V. E. Voronkov at the Kovrov Mechanical Plant. Introduced into service on May 15, 1943. The SG-43 began to enter the troops in the second half of 1943.

DShK and DShKM- large-caliber heavy machine guns chambered for 12.7 × 108 mm. The result of the modernization of the large-caliber heavy machine gun DK (Degtyarev Large-caliber). DShK was adopted by the Red Army in 1938 under the designation "12.7 mm heavy machine gun Degtyareva - Shpagin sample 1938 "

In 1946, under the designation DShKM(Degtyarev, Shpagin, modernized large-caliber,) machine gun was adopted by the Soviet Army.

PTRD. Anti-tank single-shot rifle mod. 1941 of the Degtyarev system, put into service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to combat medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances of up to 500 m.Also, a gun could fire at bunkers / bunkers and firing points covered with armor at distances of up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances of up to 500 m.

PTRS. Anti-tank self-loading rifle mod. 1941 of the Simonov system) is a Soviet self-loading anti-tank rifle, put into service on August 29, 1941. It was intended to combat medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at distances of up to 500 m.Also, the gun could fire at bunkers / bunkers and firing points, covered with armor, at distances of up to 800 m and at aircraft at distances of up to 500 m. During the war some of the guns were captured and used by the Germans. The guns were named Panzerbüchse 784 (R) or PzB 784 (R).

Dyakonov's grenade launcher. The rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system is designed to destroy live, mostly closed, targets with fragmentation grenades that are inaccessible to weapons of flat fire.

It was widely used in pre-war conflicts, during the Soviet-Finnish war and at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. According to the staff of the rifle regiment in 1939, each rifle squad was armed with a rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system. In the documents of that time, it was called a hand mortar for throwing rifle grenades.

125-mm ampoule gun sample 1941- the only serially produced ampoule-thrower model in the USSR. It was widely used with varying success by the Red Army at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, it was often made in semi-handicraft conditions.

A glass or tin ball filled with a flammable liquid "KS" was most often used as a projectile, but the range of ammunition included mines, a smoke bomb and even artisanal "propaganda shells". With the help of a 12-gauge blank rifle cartridge, the projectile was fired at 250-500 meters, thereby being an effective means against some fortifications and many types of armored vehicles, including tanks. However, difficulties in use and maintenance led to the fact that in 1942 the ampoule gun was removed from service.

ROX-3(Knapsack Flamethrower Klyuev - Sergeev) - Soviet infantry knapsack flamethrower during the Great Patriotic War. The first model of the ROKS-1 backpack flamethrower was developed in the USSR in the early 1930s. At the beginning of World War II, the rifle regiments of the Red Army had flamethrower teams in two squads, armed with 20 ROKS-2 knapsack flamethrowers. Based on the experience of using these flamethrowers at the beginning of 1942, the designer of the Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Engineering M.P. Sergeev and the designer of the military plant No. 846 V.N. Klyuev developed a more advanced ROKS-3 backpack flamethrower, which was in service with separate mouth and battalions of backpack flamethrowers of the Red Army throughout the war.

Bottles with a combustible mixture ("Molotov cocktail").

At the beginning of the war, the State Defense Committee decided to use bottles with a combustible mixture in the fight against tanks. Already on July 7, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted a special decree "On anti-tank incendiary grenades (bottles)", which ordered the People's Commissariat of the Food Industry to organize, from July 10, 1941, equipping liter glass bottles with fire mixture according to the recipe of the Scientific Research Institute 6 of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition. And the head of the Red Army's Military Chemical Protection Directorate (later the Main Military Chemical Directorate) was ordered from July 14 to begin "supplying military units with hand-held incendiary grenades."

Dozens of distilleries and breweries throughout the USSR turned into military enterprises on the fly. Moreover, "Molotov Cocktail" (named after the then deputy IV Stalin in the State Committee for Defense) was prepared directly on the old factory lines, where just yesterday they poured citro, port wines and sparkling "Abrau-Dyurso". From the first batches of such bottles, they often did not even have time to tear off the "peaceful" alcohol labels. In addition to the liter bottles indicated in the legendary "Molotov" decree, the "cocktail" was also made in beer and wine-cognac containers with a volume of 0.5 and 0.7 liters.

The Red Army adopted two types of incendiary bottles: with a self-igniting liquid KS (a mixture of phosphorus and sulfur) and with combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3, which is a mixture of aviation gasoline, kerosene, naphtha, thickened with oils or a special hardening powder OP- 2, developed in 1939 under the leadership of A.P. Ionov - in fact, it was the prototype of modern napalm. The abbreviation "KS" is deciphered in different ways: and "Koshkin mixture" - by the name of the inventor N. V. Koshkin, and "Old cognac", and "Kachugin-Solodovnik" - by the names of other inventors of liquid grenades.

A bottle with a self-igniting liquid KS, falling on a solid, broke, the liquid spilled and burned with a bright flame for up to 3 minutes, developing a temperature of up to 1000 ° C. At the same time, being sticky, it adhered to the armor or covered up viewing slots, glass, observation devices, blinded the crew with smoke, smoking it out of the tank and burning everything inside the tank. Falling on the body, a drop of burning liquid caused severe, difficult to heal burns.

Combustible mixtures No. 1 and No. 3 burned for up to 60 seconds at temperatures up to 800 ° C and emitting a lot of black smoke. As a cheaper option, bottles with gasoline were used, and thin glass ampoules-tubes with KS liquid, which were attached to the bottle with the help of pharmaceutical rubber bands, served as an incendiary. Sometimes the ampoules were put inside the bottles before being thrown.

B rone vest PZ-ZIF-20(protective shell, Frunze Plant). He is also CH-38 Breastplate type (CH-1, steel breastplate). It can be called the first mass Soviet body armor, although it was called a steel bib, which does not change its purpose.

The body armor provided protection against the German submachine gun, pistols. Also, the body armor provided protection against fragments of grenades and mines. The bulletproof vest was recommended to be worn by assault groups, signalmen (during the laying and repair of cables) and when performing other operations at the discretion of the commander.

Information often comes across that the PZ-ZIF-20 is not the SP-38 (CH-1) body armor, which is incorrect, since the PZ-ZIF-20 was created according to the documentation of 1938, and the industrial production was established in 1943. The second point is that by appearance have 100% similarity. Among the military search units it has the name "Volkhovsky", "Leningrad", "Five-section".
Reconstruction photo:

Steel bibs CH-42

Soviet assault engineer-sapper guards brigade in steel bibs CH-42 and with DP-27 machine guns. 1st ShISBr. 1st Belorussian Front, summer 1944

Hand grenade ROG-43

Hand-held fragmentation grenade ROG-43 (index 57-G-722) of remote action, designed to defeat enemy manpower in offensive and defensive combat. The new grenade was developed in the first half of the Great Patriotic War at the plant. Kalinin and had the factory designation RGK-42. After being put into service in 1943, the grenade received the designation ROG-43.

RDG hand smoke grenade.

RDG device

Smoke grenades were used to provide curtains with a size of 8-10 m and were mainly used to "blind" the enemy in shelters, to create local curtains in order to mask crews leaving armored vehicles, as well as to simulate the burning of armored vehicles. Under favorable conditions, one RDG grenade created an invisible cloud 25-30 m long.

Burning grenades did not sink in water, so they could be used when crossing water obstacles. The grenade could smoke from 1 to 1.5 minutes, forming, depending on the composition of the smoke mixture, thick gray-black or white smoke.

RPG-6 grenade.


RPG-6 exploded instantly at the moment of impact on a rigid barrier, destroyed armor, hit the crew of an armored target, its weapons and equipment, could also ignite fuel and detonate ammunition. Military tests of the RPG-6 grenade took place in September 1943. A captured assault gun "Ferdinand" was used as a target, which had frontal armor up to 200 mm and side armor up to 85 mm. The tests carried out showed that the RPG-6 grenade, when struck by its head on the target, could penetrate armor up to 120 mm.

Anti-tank hand grenade mod. 1943 RPG-43

Hand anti-tank grenade model 1941 RPG-41 shock action

RPG-41 was intended to combat armored vehicles and light tanks with armor up to 20 - 25 mm thick, and could also be used to combat pillboxes and field-type shelters. RPG-41 could also be used to destroy medium and heavy tanks when hitting vulnerable areas of the vehicle (roof, tracks, chassis, etc.)

Chemical grenade sample 1917


According to the "Provisional RKKA rifle regulations. Part 1. Small arms. Rifle and Hand Grenades ", published by the head of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in 1927, at the disposal of the Red Army to arm troops in positional combat remained a chemical hand grenade mod. 1917 from the stock prepared during the First World War.

VKG-40 grenade

In service with the Red Army in the 1920s-1930s, there was a muzzle-loading "Dyakonov grenade launcher", created at the end of the First World War and subsequently modernized.

The grenade launcher consisted of a mortar, a bipod and a quadrant sight and served to defeat manpower with a fragmentation grenade. The barrel of the mortar had a caliber of 41 mm, three screw grooves, it was rigidly fixed in a cup screwed onto the neck, which was put on the rifle barrel, fixing on the front sight with a cutout.

Hand grenade RG-42

RG-42 model 1942 with an UZRG fuse. After the grenade was adopted, the index RG-42 (hand grenade of 1942) was assigned. The new fuse of the UZRG used in the grenade became the same for both the RG-42 and the F-1.

The RG-42 grenade was used both in the offensive and in the defense. In appearance, it resembled an RGD-33 grenade, only without a handle. The RG-42 with the UZRG fuse belonged to the type of remote-action fragmentation grenades. It was intended to defeat the enemy's manpower.

Anti-tank rifle grenade VPGS-41



VPGS-41 when using

Characteristic hallmark ramrod grenades were the presence of a "tail" (ramrod) inserted into the bore of the rifle and served as a stabilizer. The grenade was fired with a blank cartridge.

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 g. with a defensive cover

Soviet hand grenade mod. 1914/30 is a double-type remote-action anti-personnel fragmentation hand grenade. This means that it is designed to destroy enemy personnel with body shrapnel during its explosion. Remote action - means that the grenade will explode after a certain period, regardless of other conditions, after the soldier releases it from his hands.

Double type - means that the grenade can be used as an offensive, i.e. fragments of a grenade have a small mass and fly at a distance less than the possible throwing range; or as defensive, i.e. the fragments fly to a distance exceeding the throwing range.

The double action of the grenade is achieved by putting on the so-called "shirt" - a cover made of thick metal, which, in the event of an explosion, provides fragments of a larger mass flying over a greater distance.

Hand grenade RGD-33

An explosive charge is placed inside the case - up to 140 g of TNT. Between the explosive charge and the body, a steel tape with a square notch is placed to obtain fragments during an explosion, rolled into three or four layers.


The grenade was equipped with a defensive cover that was used only when throwing a grenade from a trench or cover. In other cases, the protective cover was removed.

And of course, F-1 grenade

Initially, the F-1 grenade used a fuse designed by F.V. Koveshnikov, who was much more reliable and more convenient in using the French fuse. The deceleration time of the Koveshnikov fuse was 3.5-4.5 sec.

In 1941, the designers E.M. Viceni and A.A. Poor people developed and put into service instead of Koveshnikov's fuse, a new, safer and simpler fuse for the F-1 hand grenade.

In 1942, the new fuse became the same for the F-1 and RG-42 hand grenades, it was named UZRG - "unified fuse for hand grenades."

* * *
After the above, it cannot be argued that only rusty three-rulers without cartridges were in service.
About chemical weapons during the Second World War, the conversation is separate and special ...

I I - the period until 1941

In December 1917, the Council of People's Commissars announced the demobilization of military factories, but by this time the production of ammunition in the country had practically ceased. By 1918, all the main stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the World War were already exhausted. However, by the beginning of 1919, only the Tula Cartridge Plant remained operational. Lugansk cartridge in 1918 was initially captured by the Germans, then was occupied by the White Guard army of Krasnov.

For the newly created plant in Taganrog, the White Guards took from the Lugansk plant 4 machines from each development, 500 poods of gunpowder, non-ferrous metals, as well as part of the finished cartridges.
So ataman Krasnov resumed production at RUSSIAN - BALTIC plant Rus.-Balt. acc. Society of shipbuilding and mechanical plants. (Founded in 1913 in Reval, in 1915 evacuated to Taganrog, in Soviet time Taganrog Combine Plant.) And by November 1918 the productivity of this plant had increased to 300,000 rifle cartridges per day (Kakurin N. Ye. "How the Revolution Fought")

“On January 3 (1919), the Allies saw the already revived and put into operation the Russian-Baltic plant in Taganrog, where they made casings, cast bullets, inserted them into a cupronickel shell, filled the cartridges with gunpowder - in a word, the plant was already in full swing. (Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov "The Great Don Host") In the Krasnodar Territory and in the Urals, cartridges are found with the marking of D.Z.
Most likely, this marking means "Donskoy Zavod" in Taganrog

Simbirsky under construction was under the threat of capture. In the spring of 1918. the evacuation of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant to Simbirsk began. In July 1919, about 1,500 workers from Petrograd arrived in Simbirsk to establish the production of cartridges.
In 1919 the plant began to manufacture products, and in 1922 the Ulyanovsk plant was renamed into the “Volodarsky Plant”.

In addition, the Soviet government is building a new cartridge plant in Podolsk. Part of the shell factory located in the premises was taken under it. former factory"Singer". Remains of equipment from Petrograd were sent there. In the fall of 1919, the Podolsk plant began to rework foreign cartridges, and in November 1920, the first batch of rifle cartridges was produced.

Since 1924 the production of cartridges is carried out by the State Association "Main Directorate of the USSR Military Industry", which includes Tula, Lugansk, Podolsk, Ulyanovsk factories.

Since 1928, cartridge factories, in addition to Tula, have received numbers: Ulyanovsk - 3, Podolsk - 17, Lugansk - 60. (But Ulyanovsk retained its ZV marking until 1941)
Since 1934, new shops were built to the south of Podolsk. Soon they began to be called the Novopodolsk plant, and since 1940 the Klimovsk plant № 188.
In 1939 cartridge factories were reassigned to the 3rd GU of the People's Commissariat of Armaments. It includes the following factories: Ulyanovsk # 3, Podolsk # 17, Tula # 38, Experienced patr. plant (Maryina. Roshcha, Moscow) No. 44, Kuntsevsky (Red equipment) No. 46, Lugansky No. 60 and Klimovsky No. 188.

Marking of Soviet-made cartridges remains mainly with a protruding imprint.

At the top - the number or name of the plant, at the bottom - the year of manufacture.

The patrons of the Tula plant in 1919-20. the quarter is indicated, possibly in 1923-24. only the last digit of the year of manufacture is indicated, and the Lugansk plant in 1920-1927. indicates the period (1,2,3) in which they were made. The Ulyanovsk plant in 1919-30 puts the name of the plant (C, U, ZV) at the bottom.

In 1930, the spherical bottom part of the liner was replaced with a flat one with a chamfer. The replacement was caused by problems that arose when firing from the Maxim machine gun. The protruding markings are located along the edge of the case bottom. And only in the 1970s, sleeves began to be marked with an extruded impression on a flat surface closer to the center.

*Note. The table is not complete, there may be other options

Cases of the Lugansk plant with additional designations + are very rare. Most likely, these are technological designations and cartridges were intended only for test firing.

There is an opinion that in 1928-1936 the Penza plant produced cartridges with markings number 50, but it is more likely that this is an indistinct mark number 60

Perhaps at the end of the thirties, the release of cartridges or casings was carried out at the Moscow "Shot Foundry" No. 58, which then produced tail cartridges for mortar mines.

In 1940-41 in Novosibirsk, plant No. 179 NKB (People's Commissariat of Ammunition) produced rifle cartridges.

The sleeve for the ShKAS machine gun, in contrast to an ordinary rifle sleeve, has, in addition to the factory number and the year of manufacture, an additional stamp - the letter "Ш".
Cartridges with a ShKAS sleeve, having a red primer color, were used for firing only from synchronous air machine guns.

R. Chumak K. Soloviev Cartridges for a super-machine gun. Magazine "Kalashnikov" No. 1 2001

Notes:
Finland, which used the Mosin rifle, produced and also purchased in the United States and other countries, cartridges 7.62x54, which are found on the battlefield of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 and the Second World War. Presumably, pre-revolutionary Russian-made cartridges were also used.

In the 1920s and 30s, the United States used Mosin rifles left over from the Russian order for training purposes and sold them for private use, releasing cartridges for this. Deliveries to Finland in 1940

Germany during World War I used a captured Mosin rifle to arm auxiliary and rear units.

Spain during the civil war received a large number of various, mostly outdated, weapons from the USSR. Including the Mosin rifle. The production of cartridges was established. It is possible that in the beginning Soviet-made cartridge cases were used, which were reloaded and new markings were applied to them.

The British company Kynoch supplied cartridges to Finland and Estonia. According to the data providedGOST from "P.Labbett &F.A.Brown.Foreignrifle-caliberammunition manufactured in Britain.London, 1994., "Kynoch signed contracts for the supply of 7.62x54 cartridges:

1929 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1932 Estonia (with a heavy bullet weighing 12.12 grams.)
1938 Estonia (with tracer bullet)
1929 Finland (with tracer bullet, armor-piercing bullet)
1939 Finland (with tracer bullet)

The cartridge 7.62x54 was produced in 20-40 years and in other countries for commercial purposes:

It is possible that some of the above-mentioned foreign ammunition could have ended up in Soviet warehouses in small quantities as a result of the annexation of the western territories and the Finnish War, and were most likely used by parts of the "people's militia" in the initial period of the Second World War. Also, nowadays, they are often found during archaeological research of places of World War II battles in Soviet positions, casings and cartridges made in the USA and England by order of Russia for 1 world war... The order was not completed in full on time, and already during the Civil War it was supplied to the White Army. After the end of the civil war, the remnants of these ammunition settled in warehouses, probably used by the security units and OSOAVIAKHIM, but turned out to be in demand with the beginning of the Second World War.
Occasionally found on the battlefield casings of a 7.7mm British rifle cartridge (.303 British), which are mistaken for 7.62x54R ammunition. These cartridges were used, in particular, by the armies of the Baltic states and in 1940 were used for the Red Army. Near Leningrad there are such cartridges marked with V-Riga plant "Vairogs" (VAIROGS, formerly Sellier & Bellot)
.
Later, such cartridges of English and Canadian production came under Lend-Lease.

I I I - period 1942-1945

In 1941, all factories, except for Ulyanovsk, were partially or completely evacuated, and the old numbers of the factories were retained in a new location. For example, the Barnaul plant, transported from Podolsk, produced its first products on November 24, 1941. Some plants were re-created. The numbering of all cartridge productions is given, since there is no exact data on the range of products they produce.

According to B. Davydov, rifle cartridges were produced at factories during the war. 17 ,38 (1943), 44 (1941-42),46 ,60 ,179 (1940-41),188 ,304 (1942),529 ,539 (1942-43),540 ,541 (1942-43), 543 ,544 ,545 ,710 (1942-43),711 (1942).

When restored in 1942-1944, the factories received new designations.

This stigma is probably the product manufactured by the Podolsk plant during the period when its work was resumed.
There may be other designations as well. For example, No. 10 in 1944 (found on TT cartridges), but the location of the production is unknown, perhaps it is the Perm plant or the badly read brand of the Podolsk plant.

Since 1944, it is possible to designate the month of release of the cartridge.
For example, a 1946 training cartridge has such markings.

IV - Post-war period

In the post-war years in the USSR, the factories in Klimovsk-No. 711, Tula-No. 539, Voroshilovgrad (Lugansk) -No. 270, Ulyanovsk-No. 3, Yuryuzani-No. 38, Novosibirsk-No. 188, Barnaul-No. 17 and Frunze remained in ammunition production. -№60.

Rifle cartridge markings from this period of production remain mostly with a protruding imprint. In the upper part - the plant number, in the lower part - the year of manufacture.

In 1952-1956, the following designations are used to indicate the year of manufacture:

D = 1952, D = 1953, E = 1954, H = 1955, K = 1956.

After the Second World War, a cartridge of caliber 7.62 was also produced in the Warsaw Pact countries, China, Iraq and Egypt, and other countries .. Possible designations

This cartridge is still produced at Russian factories in combat and hunting performance.

Modern names and some of the options for commercial markings on Russian cartridges since 1990

Designs, characteristics of various bullets for cartridges of 7.62 caliber are well represented in modern literature on weapons and therefore only color designations of bullets are given according to the "Handbook of cartridges ..." 1946.

Most of the above information is provided by the director of the Museum of History and Local Lore of the Lomonosov District of the Leningrad Region
Vladimir Andreevich Golovatyuk , for many years dealing with the history of small arms, ammunition.
The museum has collected a lot of materials and exhibits on the history of the region, military operations on the territory of the region during the Second World War. Excursions are regularly held for schoolchildren and everyone. T Museum phone 8 812 423 05 66

In addition, here is the information I have on rifle cartridges of an earlier period:
Cartridge for Krnka rifle, Baranova
Produced at the Petersburg plant (and some workshops without designations)

Probably L is the name of the Foundry Workshop of St. Petersburg.

Probably VGO - Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant.

The designation for the third of the year of manufacture appears

Petersburg plant

Unfortunately, I have no information on the designations until 1880, most likely the letter B denotes the Vasileostrovsky cartridge case department of the St. Petersburg cartridge plant, and the upper sign is the name of the brass manufacturer.

Manufactured by Keller & Co., Hirtenberg Austria, probably commissioned by Bulgaria for the Serbo-Bulgarian War.

Many letters

The female name Katyusha went down in the history of Russia and in world history as the name of one of the most terrible weapons of the Second World War.
At the same time, none of the weapons were surrounded by such a veil of secrecy and disinformation ...

HISTORY PAGES

How many our fathers-commanders did not secret the materiel of the Katyusha, within a few weeks after the first combat use it fell into the hands of the Germans and ceased to be a secret. But the history of the creation of "Katyusha" for many years was kept "with seven seals" both because of the ideological guidelines and because of the ambitions of the designers.

The first question is why rocket artillery was used only in 1941? After all, powder rockets were used by the Chinese a thousand years ago. In the first half of the 19th century, rockets were widely used in European armies (rockets by V. Kongrev, A. Zasyadko, K. Konstantinov and others).

Rocket launchers of the early 19th century V. Kongreva (a) and I. Kosinsky (b)

Alas, the combat use of missiles was limited by their huge dispersion. At first, long poles made of wood or iron - "tails" were used to stabilize them. But such missiles were effective only for hitting area targets. So, for example, in 1854, the Anglo-French from rowing boats fired missiles at Odessa, and the Russians in the 50s-70s of the XIX century - Central Asian cities.

But with the introduction of rifled guns, powder rockets became an anachronism, and between 1860-1880 they were removed from service in all European armies (in Austria - in 1866, in England - in 1885, in Russia - in 1879). In 1914, only signal flares remained in the armies and navies of all countries. Nevertheless, Russian inventors constantly turned to the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) with projects of military missiles. So, in September 1905, the Artillery Committee rejected the high-explosive missile project. The warhead of this rocket was stuffed with pyroxylin, and the fuel was not black, but smokeless powder... Moreover, the fellows from GAU did not even try to work out an interesting project, but brushed it off the doorstep. It is curious that the designer was ... Hieromonk Kirik.

It was only during the First World War that interest in missiles was revived. There are three main reasons for this. First, slow-burning gunpowders were created, which made it possible to dramatically increase flight speed and firing range. Accordingly, with the increase in flight speed, it became possible to effectively use the wing stabilizers and improve the accuracy of fire.

Second reason: the need to create powerful weapon for airplanes of the First World War - "flying whatnots".

And finally, the most important reason - the missile was best suited as a delivery vehicle for chemical weapons.


CHEMICAL PROJECT

As early as June 15, 1936, the head of the RKKA chemical department, corps engineer Ya.Fishman, was presented with a report by the director of the RNII, 1st rank military engineer I. Kleimenov and the head of the 1st department, 2nd rank military engineer K. Glukharev on preliminary tests of 132/82-mm short-range chemical missile mines ... This ammunition was complemented by a 250/132-mm short-range chemical mine, tests of which were completed by May 1936.

Rocket projectile M-13.
The M-13 projectile consists of a head and a body. The head has a shell and a combat charge. A fuse is attached to the front of the head. The hull ensures the flight of the rocket projectile and consists of a casing, a combustion chamber, a nozzle and stabilizers. In the front part of the combustion chamber there are two electro-powder igniters. On the outer surface of the shell of the combustion chamber, there are two threaded guide pins, which serve to hold the rocket projectile in the guide assemblies. 1 - fuse retaining ring, 2 - GVMZ fuse, 3 - detonator checker, 4 - explosive charge, 5 - head part, 6 - igniter, 7 - chamber bottom, 8 - guide pin, 9 - powder rocket charge, 10 - rocket part, 11 - grate, 12 - nozzle critical section, 13 - nozzle, 14 - stabilizer, 15 - remote fuse check, 16 - AGDT remote fuse, 17 - igniter.

Thus, "RNII has completed all the preliminary development of the issue of creating a powerful means of short-range chemical attack, expects from you a general conclusion on the tests and instructions on the need further work in this direction. For its part, the RNII considers it necessary now to issue a pilot-gross order for the manufacture of RKhM-250 (300 units) and RKhM-132 (300 units) in order to conduct field and military tests. Five RKhM-250 units remaining from preliminary tests, three of which are at the Central Chemical Test Site (Prichernavskaya station) and three RKhM-132 units can be used for additional tests at your instructions. "

Experimental installation M-8 on a tank

According to the report of the RNII on the main activity for 1936 on topic No. 1, samples of 132-mm and 250-mm chemical rockets with a warhead capacity of 6 and 30 liters of OM were manufactured and tested. The tests, carried out in the presence of the head of the VOKHIMU of the Red Army, gave satisfactory results and received a positive assessment. But VOKHIMA did nothing to introduce these shells into the Red Army and gave the RNII new tasks for shells with a longer range.

For the first time, the Katyusha prototype (BM-13) was mentioned on January 3, 1939, in a letter from the People's Commissar of the Defense Industry Mikhail Kaganovich to his brother, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Lazar Kaganovich: “In October 1938, a mechanized automobile rocket launcher for the organization of a surprise chemical attack on the enemy, it has basically passed factory shooting tests at the Sofrinsky artillery test range and is currently undergoing range tests at the Central Military Chemical Range in Prichernavskaya. "

Experimental installation M-13 on a trailer

Let's pay attention to the fact that the customers of the future Katyusha are military chemists. Funding for the work was also carried out through the Chemical Directorate, and, finally, the missile warheads are exclusively chemical.

The RHS-132 132-mm chemical shells were tested by firing at the Pavlograd artillery range on August 1, 1938. The fire was carried out with single shells and series of 6 and 12 shells. The duration of a series of full ammunition firing did not exceed 4 seconds. During this time, the target area reached 156 liters of OV, which, in terms of artillery caliber 152 mm, was equivalent to 63 artillery shells when firing a volley of 21 three-gun batteries or 1.3 artillery regiment, provided that the fire was fired by unstable OV. The tests focused on the fact that the metal consumption for 156 liters of OM when firing rockets was 550 kg, while when firing 152-mm chemical projectiles, the weight of the metal was 2370 kg, that is, 4.3 times more.

The test report stated: “The automotive mechanized rocket launcher for chemical attack, when tested, showed significant advantages over artillery systems. The three-ton machine is equipped with a system capable of firing both single fire and a series of 24 shots for 3 seconds. Travel speed is normal for a truck. Transfer from traveling to combat position takes 3-4 minutes. Firing - from the driver's cab or from a shelter.

The first experimental installation of the M-13 on a car chassis

The warhead of one RHS (chemical rocket projectile. - "NVO") holds 8 liters of OM, and in artillery shells of a similar caliber - only 2 liters. To create a dead zone on an area of ​​12 hectares, one salvo from three trucks is enough, which replaces 150 howitzers or 3 artillery regiments. At a distance of 6 km, the area of ​​OM contamination in one salvo is 6–8 hectares.

I will note that the Germans also have their own attitudes. salvo fire was also prepared exclusively for chemical warfare. So, in the late 1930s, the German engineer Nebel designed a 15-cm rocket and a six-barreled tubular installation, which the Germans called a six-barreled mortar. Tests of the mortar were started in 1937. The system was named "D-type 15-cm smoke mortar". In 1941 it was renamed 15 cm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer), that is, 15 cm smoke mortar mod. 41. Naturally, their main purpose was not setting up smoke screens, but firing rockets filled with toxic substances. Interestingly, Soviet soldiers called the 15 cm Nb.W 41 "Vanyusha", by analogy with the M-13, called "Katyusha".

Nb.W 41

The first launch of the Katyusha prototype (designed by Tikhomirov and Artemiev) took place in the USSR on March 3, 1928. The flight range of the 22.7-kg rocket was 1300 m, and a van Deren system mortar was used as a launcher.

The caliber of our missiles during the Great Patriotic War - 82 mm and 132 mm - was determined by nothing more than the diameter of the engine's gunpowder bricks. Seven 24-mm powder sticks, tightly packed into the combustion chamber, give a diameter of 72 mm, the thickness of the chamber walls - 5 mm, hence the diameter (caliber) of the rocket - 82 mm. Seven thicker (40 mm) checkers in the same way give 132 mm caliber.

The most important issue in the design of rockets was the method of stabilization. Soviet designers preferred feathered rockets and adhered to this principle until the end of the war.

In the 1930s, rockets with an annular stabilizer that did not go beyond the dimensions of the projectile were tested. Such shells could be fired from tubular guides. But tests have shown that it is impossible to achieve stable flight with the help of an annular stabilizer.

Then they fired off 82-mm missiles with a four-blade tail span of 200, 180, 160, 140 and 120 mm. The results were quite definite - with a decrease in tail span, flight stability and accuracy decreased. The plumage, with a span of more than 200 mm, shifted the center of gravity of the projectile back, which also worsened the stability of the flight. Facilitation of the tail by reducing the thickness of the stabilizer blades caused strong vibrations of the blades up to their destruction.

Flute guides were adopted as launchers for feathered missiles. Experiments have shown that the longer they are, the higher the accuracy of the shells. The length of 5 m for the RS-132 became the maximum due to restrictions on railway dimensions.

Note that the Germans stabilized their missiles until 1942 exclusively by rotation. The USSR also tested turbojet missiles, but they did not go into mass production. As it often happens with us, the reason for the failures during the tests was explained not by the poor performance, but by the irrationality of the concept.

FIRST VALUES

Whether we like it or not, for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Germans used multiple launch rocket systems on June 22, 1941, near Brest. “And now the arrows showed 03.15, the command“ Fire! ”Sounded, and the devilish dance began. The earth was shaking. Nine batteries of the 4th Special-Purpose Mortar Regiment also contributed to the hellish symphony. In half an hour, 2880 shells whistled over the Bug and fell on the city and the fortress on the eastern bank of the river. Heavy 600-mm mortars and 210-mm guns of the 98th Artillery Regiment rained down their volleys on the fortifications of the citadel and hit point targets - the positions of the Soviet artillery. It seemed that there would be no stone left over from the fortress ”.

So the historian Paul Karel described the first use of 15-cm rocket launchers. In addition, the Germans in 1941 used heavy 28-cm high-explosive and 32-cm incendiary turbojet projectiles. The shells were over-caliber and had one powder engine (the diameter of the motor part was 140 mm).

A 28-cm high-explosive mine with a direct hit into a stone house completely destroyed it. The mine successfully destroyed field-type shelters. Living targets within a radius of several tens of meters were hit by a blast wave. Mine fragments flew at a distance of up to 800 m. The warhead contained 50 kg of liquid TNT or 40/60 grade ammatol. It is curious that both 28-cm and 32-cm German mines (missiles) were transported and launched from the simplest wooden box-type closure.

The first use of "Katyusha" took place on July 14, 1941. The battery of Captain Ivan Andreevich Flerov fired two volleys from seven launchers at the Orsha railway station. The appearance of "Katyusha" was a complete surprise for the leadership of the Abwehr and the Wehrmacht. On August 14, the main command of the German ground forces notified its troops: “The Russians have an automatic multi-barreled flamethrower cannon ... The shot is fired by electricity. During the shot, smoke is formed ... When capturing such cannons, report immediately. " Two weeks later, a directive appeared, entitled "Russian Cannon Throwing Rocket-Like Shells." It said: “... The troops are reporting on the use of a new type of weapon by the Russians, firing rockets. A large number of shots can be fired from one installation within 3-5 seconds ... Each appearance of these weapons must be reported to the general in command of the chemical forces under the high command on the same day. "

It is not known for certain where the name "Katyusha" came from. The version of Peter Hooke is curious: “Both at the front, and then, after the war, when I got acquainted with the archives, talked with veterans, read their speeches in print, I came across a variety of explanations of how the formidable weapon got its maiden name. Some people believed that the beginning was made with the letter "K", which was put by the Voronezh Cominternists on their products. There was a legend among the troops that the guards mortars were named after the dashing partisan girl who destroyed many Nazis. "

When the soldiers and commanders asked the representative of the GAU to name the "real" name of the combat mount during the range firing, he advised: “Call the mount as a conventional artillery piece. This is important to maintain secrecy. "

Soon, Katyusha had a younger brother named Luka. In May 1942, a group of officers from the Main Armaments Directorate developed the M-30 projectile, in which a powerful over-caliber warhead made in the form of an ellipsoid with a maximum diameter of 300 mm was attached to the M-13 rocket engine.

Installation M-30 "Luka"

After successful field trials, June 8, 1942 State Committee Defense (GKO) issued a decree on the adoption of the M-30 and the beginning of its serial production. In Stalin's times, all important problems were solved quickly, and by July 10, 1942, the first 20 M-30 guards mortar battalions were created. Each of them had a three-battery composition, the battery consisted of 32 four-charge single-tier launchers. The divisional salvo was 384 projectiles, respectively.

The first combat use of the M-30 took place in the 61st Army of the Western Front near the city of Belev. In the afternoon of June 5, two regimental volleys rained down on the German positions in Annino and Verkhniye Doltsy with a thunderous roar. Both villages were wiped off the face of the earth, after which the infantry occupied them without loss.

The power of the Luka shells (M-30 and its modifications M-31) made a great impression on both the enemy and our soldiers. There were many different assumptions and inventions about "Luka" at the front. One of the legends was that as if warhead missiles are stuffed with some kind of special, especially powerful, explosive, capable of burning everything in the area of ​​the gap. In fact, conventional explosives were used in the warheads. The exceptional effect of the Luka shells was achieved through salvo fire. With the simultaneous or almost simultaneous explosion of an entire group of shells, the law of addition of impulses from shock waves came into force.

Installation of M-30 "Luka" on the Studebaker chassis

The M-30 shells had high-explosive, chemical and incendiary warheads. However, the main use was a high-explosive warhead. For the characteristic shape of the head part of the M-30, the front-line soldiers called him "Luka Mudishchev" (the hero of Barkov's poem of the same name). Naturally, the official press preferred not to mention this nickname, in contrast to the replicated "Katyusha". "Luka", like the German 28-cm and 30-cm shells, was launched from a wooden packing box, in which it was delivered from the factory. Four, and later eight of these boxes were placed on a special frame, resulting in the simplest launcher.

Needless to say, after the war, the journalistic and writers' brotherhood remembered "Katyusha" to the right place and out of place, but preferred to forget her much more formidable brother "Luka". In the 1970s – 1980s, at the very first mention of Luka, veterans asked me with surprise: “How do you know? You didn’t fight. ”

ANTI-TANK MYTH

The Katyusha was a first-class weapon. As often happens, the fathers-commanders wanted it to become a universal weapon, including an anti-tank weapon.

An order is an order, and victorious reports rushed to the headquarters. If you believe the secret publication "Field Rocket Artillery in the Great Patriotic War" (Moscow, 1955), then on the Kursk Bulge in two days in three episodes "Katyusha" destroyed 95 enemy tanks! If this were true, then the anti-tank artillery should have been disbanded and replaced with multiple launch rocket launchers.

In some ways, the huge numbers of destroyed tanks were influenced by the fact that for each destroyed tank, the crew of a combat vehicle received 2,000 rubles, of which 500 rubles. - to the commander, 500 rubles. - the gunner, the rest - to the rest.

Alas, due to the huge dispersion, firing at tanks is ineffective. So I take in my hands the boring brochure "Tables of firing rockets M-13" edition of 1942. It follows from it that at a firing range of 3000 m, the range deviation was 257 m, and the lateral deviation was 51 m. For shorter distances, the range deviation was not given at all, since the dispersion of the projectiles could not be calculated. It is not hard to imagine the likelihood of a missile hitting a tank at such a distance. If, theoretically, imagine that the combat vehicle somehow managed to shoot at the tank point-blank, then the muzzle velocity of the 132-mm projectile was only 70 m / s, which is clearly not enough to penetrate the armor of the Tiger or Panther.

It is not for nothing that the year of publication of the shooting tables is stipulated here. According to the firing tables of the TS-13 of the same M-13 missile, the average deviation in range in 1944 is 105 m, and in 1957 - 135 m, and the lateral deviation, respectively, 200 and 300 m. in which the dispersion increased by almost 1.5 times, so that in the tables of 1944 there are errors in calculations or, most likely, deliberate falsification to raise the morale of the personnel.

There is no doubt that if an M-13 projectile hits a medium or light tank, it will be disabled. The M-13 projectile is unable to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger. But in order to be guaranteed to hit a single tank from a distance of the same 3 thousand meters, it is necessary to fire from 300 to 900 M-13 shells due to their huge dispersion, at smaller distances an even larger number of missiles will be required.

And here is another example, told by veteran Dmitry Loza. During the Uman-Botoshan offensive operation on March 15, 1944, two Shermans from the 45th mechanized brigade of the 5th mechanized corps got stuck in the mud. Troopers jumped off the tanks and retreated. German soldiers surrounded the stuck tanks, “covered up the viewing slots with mud, covered the sighting holes in the turret with black earth, completely blinding the crew. They knocked on the hatches, tried to open them with rifle bayonets. And everyone was bawling: “Rus, kaput! Give up! " But then two left combat vehicles BM-13. "Katyushas" with their front wheels quickly descended into the ditch and fired a volley of direct fire. Bright fiery arrows hiss and hiss rushed into the hollow. In a moment, blinding flames danced around. When the smoke from the missile explosions cleared, the tanks stood at first glance unharmed, only the hulls and turrets were covered with thick soot ...

Having corrected the damage to the tracks, throwing away the burnt tarpaulins, the Emcha went to Mogilev-Podolsk. " So, thirty-two 132-mm M-13 projectiles were fired at close range at two Shermans, and they ... only had their tarpaulin burned.

WAR STATISTICS

The first installations for firing the M-13 had the BM-13-16 index and were mounted on the chassis of the ZIS-6 car. The 82-mm BM-8-36 launcher was also mounted on the same chassis. There were only a few hundred ZIS-6 cars, and at the beginning of 1942 their production was discontinued.

Launchers of M-8 and M-13 missiles in 1941-1942 were mounted on anything. Thus, six M-8 guides were installed on machines from the Maxim machine gun, 12 M-8 guides were installed on a motorcycle, sleighs and snowmobiles (M-8 and M-13), T-40 and T-60 tanks, armored railroad platforms (BM-8-48, BM-8-72, BM-13-16), river and sea boats, etc. But basically launchers in 1942-1944 were mounted on cars received under Lend-Lease: Austin, Dodge, Ford-Marmon, Bedford, etc.

For 5 years of the war, out of 3374 chassis used for combat vehicles, the ZIS-6 accounted for 372 (11%), the Studebaker - 1845 (54.7%), the remaining 17 chassis types (except for the Willys with mountain launchers) - 1157 (34.3%). Finally, it was decided to standardize combat vehicles based on the Studebaker vehicle. In April 1943, such a system was adopted under the designation BM-13N (normalized). In March 1944, a self-propelled launcher for the M-13 on the Studebaker chassis BM-31-12 was adopted.

But in the post-war years, the Studebaker was ordered to be forgotten, although combat vehicles on its chassis were in service until the early 1960s. In secret instructions "Studebaker" was called "cross-country vehicle". On numerous pedestals, Katyusha mutants ascended on the ZIS-5 chassis or post-war types of cars, which are stubbornly passed off as genuine military relics, but the original BM-13-16 on the ZIS-6 chassis has survived only in the Artillery Museum in St. Petersburg.

As already mentioned, the Germans captured several launchers and hundreds of 132 mm M-13 and 82 mm M-8 shells back in 1941. The Wehrmacht command believed that their turbojet projectiles and tubular launchers with revolver-type guides were better than Soviet wing-stabilized projectiles. But the SS took up the M-8 and M-13 and ordered the Skoda company to copy them.

In 1942, on the basis of the 82-mm Soviet M-8 projectile in Zbroevka, 8 cm R. Sprgr rockets were created. In fact, it was a new projectile, and not a copy of the M-8, although outwardly the German projectile was very similar to the M-8.

Unlike the Soviet projectile, the stabilizer feathers were set obliquely at an angle of 1.5 degrees to the longitudinal axis. Due to this, the projectile rotated in flight. The rotation speed was many times less than that of a turbojet projectile, and did not play any role in stabilizing the projectile, but it eliminated the eccentricity of the thrust of a single-nozzle rocket engine. But eccentricity, that is, the displacement of the engine thrust vector due to uneven combustion of gunpowder in the checkers, was the main reason for the low accuracy of Soviet missiles of the M-8 and M-13 type.

German installation for firing prototypes of Soviet missiles

On the basis of the Soviet M-13, the Skoda company created a number of 15-cm missiles with oblique wings for the SS and the Luftwaffe, but they were produced in small series. Our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and our designers made their own samples based on them. Missiles M-13 and M-31 with oblique plumage were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned special ballistic indexes - TS-46 and TS-47.

R.Sprgr shell

The apotheosis of the combat use of "Katyusha" and "Luka" was the storming of Berlin. In total, more than 44 thousand guns and mortars were involved in the Berlin operation, as well as 1785 M-30 and M-31 launchers, 1620 rocket artillery combat vehicles (219 divisions). In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the rich experience they gained in the battles for Poznan, which consisted of direct fire with single M-31, M-20 and even M-13 projectiles.

At first glance, this method of firing may seem primitive, but its results have been very significant. Firing single rockets during battles in such a huge city as Berlin has found the most widespread use.

To conduct such fire, assault groups of approximately the following composition were created in the guards mortar units: an officer - the group commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8-10 - for the M-13 assault group.

The intensity of the battles and the firing missions performed by rocket artillery in the battles for Berlin can be judged by the number of rockets expended in these battles. In the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army it was used up: M-13 shells - 6270; shells M-31 - 3674; shells M-20 - 600; shells M-8 - 1878.

Of this number, the assault groups of rocket artillery used up: 1638 M-8 shells; shells M-13 - 3353; shells M-20 - 191; shells M-31 - 479.

These groups in Berlin destroyed 120 buildings, which were strong centers of enemy resistance, destroyed three 75-mm guns, suppressed dozens of firing points, killed over 1000 enemy soldiers and officers.

So, our glorious "Katyusha" and her unjustly offended brother "Luka" have become a weapon of victory in the full sense of the word!

The information used in writing this material is, in principle, generally known. But maybe at least someone will learn something new for themselves